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RETHINKING THE “GOOD CAUSE” 
REQUIREMENT:  A NEW FEDERAL APPROACH 
TO GRANTING PROTECTIVE ORDERS UNDER 
F.R.C.P. 26(c) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Think Big Technologies” is the leading and only source of cameras 
for “AMAX” films.1  “AMAX” films are surround-vision films which are 
shown in theaters and immerse the viewer in the experience depicted by 
the film.  For example, one recent film titled “Glass Barrel Ride” depicted 
a plunge over the Niagara waterfalls in a glass barrel. 
Think Big’s cameras accomplish this effect by using a unique 
photographic method.  Since 1963, Think Big has developed and sold 
equipment to display its films.  It also operates theaters around the 
world.  It has never, however, sold equipment to make the surround 
vision films, and no other competitor has entered the market.  
Think Big contracted with Cokesi Company to supply caffeinated 
soda beverages for all of its theaters’ snack-bars.  Recently, a dispute 
arose regarding the scope of the contract.  Cokesi believes that Think Big 
is bound to sell only Cokesi sodas, while Think Big asserts that the 
contract is not exclusive and that it is free to also contract with Pepsoke, 
Cokesi’s soda competitor.  
During discovery, Cokesi requested information about the surround-
vision cameras and film methods that Think Big utilizes to produce the 
surround vision films.  Think Big immediately requested a protective 
order under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) to keep 
discovery materials, particularly those involving its fundamental trade 
secret—the surround-vision filming process—confidential.  Accordingly, 
Think Big enumerated a long list of “good cause” reasons to support the 
protective order request.  Cokesi did not contest the protective order 
request, as it would also prefer to keep all discovery materials 
confidential for the sake of efficiency. 
As the judge considered the request, many questions came to mind.  
She acknowledged that Think Big’s business information might 
somehow be relevant to the litigation, but was that sufficient reason to 
deny the protective order?  She reasoned that it may be possible for 
another company to get a business advantage by releasing Think Big’s 
                                                 
1 The facts in this introductory hypothetical are fictional. 
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camera technology, but was that sufficient reason to grant a protective 
order?  She predicted that confidentiality may speed up the discovery 
process, because the litigation involved large companies, but was that 
sufficient reason to grant a protective order? 
Looking to precedent, in her circuit and around other federal 
circuits, the judge found very little, often inconsistent, guidance.  Even 
though some federal judges granted similar protective orders to protect 
trade secrets, other circuits definitively prioritized public access over 
confidentiality, making her unsure as to whether “good cause” existed in 
this instance.  This judge did not know what process to follow, what 
information to consider, or what questions to ask.  
As the preceding scenario demonstrates, the process by which 
protective orders are granted in federal court is unclear, complex, and, 
frankly, unpredictable.  Think Big Technologies has an immense interest 
in keeping its film-making process confidential, while Cokesi is invested 
in getting as much information as possible about Think Big’s business 
practices.  Despite the high stakes for both litigating parties, the judicial 
process for ascertaining “good cause” to grant protective orders under 
F.R.C.P. 26(c) is not clear.2  On the federal level, the circuits have adopted 
a variety of approaches which differ in the scope and treatment of trade 
secrets.3  Some judges automatically grant uncontested protective orders, 
others require a particularized showing of fact in order to satisfy “good 
cause,” still others are adverse to confidentiality and refuse to grant 
protective orders.4  Because the F.R.C.P. itself does not provide 
guidelines for judges to consider when issuing protective orders, the 
approaches vary significantly.  As a result, when requesting a protective 
order, the parties are not privy to what criteria each particular judge will 
consider or to what constitutes “good cause.”  This uncertainty may 
inhibit attorneys from acting in accord with their fiduciary obligations, 
because even if a protective order is in the clients’ best interests, it is 
impossible to predict whether the litigation will yield the desired 
confidentiality.5 
                                                 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 Id. 
4 See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
5 See infra Part II.C.3. (discussing how the absence of a standard approach impedes 
attorneys’ ability to act in their clients’ best interest and, also, how legislation aimed at 
increasing public access divides attorneys’ fiduciary duty between their clients and the 
public at-large). 
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This Note explores the various federal circuit approaches for 
determining “good cause” and granting protective orders, analyzes 
shortcomings of the current, incomplete approaches, and proposes a 
process for federal judges to follow when ascertaining whether a 
protective order is proper.  Part II of this Note explores and establishes 
the basic components of protective orders, outlines the courts’ various 
methods of determining whether “good cause” exists, and specifically 
examines the Third Circuit’s approach.6  Part III analyzes the courts’ 
application of the Third Circuit’s “good cause” balancing test and asserts 
that its narrow list of “good cause” balancing factors fails to account for 
the broad range of grounds for protective orders, including trade 
secrets.7  Part III, additionally, examines how the absence of a methodical 
approach to granting protective orders undermines attorneys’ fiduciary 
duties to act in their clients’ best interests.8  Finally, Part IV proposes the 
“Good Cause Doctrine,” a procedural framework with distinct 
guidelines, comporting with attorneys’ fiduciary duties, for federal 
judges to follow when considering whether “good cause” exists to grant 
a protective order under F.R.C.P. 26(c).9  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Civil litigation is a system that involves secrecy.10  Protective orders, 
the method by which judges protect the confidentiality of discovery 
materials, create tension between individual litigants’ confidentiality 
concerns and public access to the judicial system.11  Tracing the distinct 
evolution of protective orders throughout American jurisprudence sheds 
light on their function in discovery, as well as their direct effect on 
individual privacy and public access to the judiciary.12  
Part II examines the prevalence of confidentiality in discovery.13  By 
specifically focusing on the development of discovery and protective 
orders, Part II.A emphasizes that public access to the judiciary is not 
absolute.14  Next, Part II.B assesses the components of protective orders, 
identifies the F.R.C.P.’s “good cause” requirement, and outlines the 
courts’ various methods of determining whether “good cause” exists to 
                                                 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Part IV. 
10 See infra Part II.A. 
11 See infra Part II.B.1. 
12 See infra Part II.A. 
13 See infra Parts II.A-B. 
14 See infra Part II.A. 
Kutz: Rethinking the "Good Cause" Requirement: A New Federal Approach t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
294 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
warrant a protective order.15  Finally, Part II of this Note concludes by 
categorizing state “sunshine in litigation” legislation that attempts to 
maximize public access by limiting judicial discretion to grant protective 
orders, and identifies how such a requirement interferes with attorneys’ 
fiduciary duty to serve their clients’ best interests.16  
A. The Prevalence of Confidentiality in Discovery 
[T]he most important office, and the one which all of us 
can and should fill, is that of private citizen.17 
1. The American Discovery Revolution:  A Historical Perspective 
Confidentiality saturates the history of the American judicial 
system.18  Based on concerns regarding intrusion into individuals’ 
private lives and confidential personal matters, Justices Louis D. 
Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren submitted an article to the Harvard Law 
Review at the end of the 19th century proposing that people are entitled 
                                                 
15 See infra Part II.B. 
16 See infra Part II.C. 
17 PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 66 (Schocken Books 2d 
ed. 1989) (quoting Louis D. Brandeis). 
18 HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 197 (Ams Pr. Inc. 1953).  The United 
States has a highly-prized tradition of privacy.  “The prevalence of concealment 
mechanisms, employed through judicially-sanctioned private-party agreements to obscure 
undesirable information from public scrutiny, is not a sudden development.  Despite 
indicia of widespread secrecy throughout the judicial system, the emergence of secrecy in 
American litigation is more accurately depicted as a tortoise than a hare.”  Albert Louis 
Chollet III, Enabling the Gaze: Public Access and the Withdrawal of Tennessee’s Proposed Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1A, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 695, 700 (2006).  It is undisputed that “secrecy has 
long been a part of the American legal system.”  James V. Grimaldi, Hearsay: The Lawyer’s 
Column; Recalls Spark Anti-Secrecy Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2000, at F35.  At the turn of the 
20th Century, William H. Moody, the U.S. Attorney General, recognized the acceptability 
and expectability of secrecy by noting that the records from the Department of Commerce 
and Labor “are executive documents acquired by the Government for the purpose of 
administering its own affairs. . . and must therefore be classed as privileged 
communications whose production can not be compelled by a court without the express 
authority of a law of the United States.”  25 Op. Atty Gen. 326 (1905).  The prevalence of 
judicial secrecy continued throughout the mid-20th century as George G. Killenger wrote 
in 1950: “In the future. . . desired information will be supplied if, in our opinion, such 
information would be compatible with the welfare of society.”  Letter from George G. 
Killenger, Chair of the U.S. Board of Parole (Oct. 27, 1950), reprinted in HAROLD L. CROSS, 
THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 309 n.3 (Ams Pr. Inc. 1953).  Historically, secrecy was clearly 
the norm in the judiciary.  The reality was that “in the absence of a general or specific act of 
Congress creating a clear right to inspect—and such acts are not numerous—there is no 
enforceable legal right in public or press to inspect any federal non-judicial record.”  
HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 197 (Ams Pr. Inc. 1953). 
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to a legal right of privacy.19  Public awareness and attention toward the 
prevalence of secrecy in judicial proceedings escalated a few decades 
later, soon after the establishment and adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in 1938.20  
                                                 
19 Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 
(1890).  The notion of privacy is well-established in American legal theory.   This article 
provided, in part, that: 
[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new 
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the 
demands of society. . . [g]radually the scope of these legal rights 
broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to 
enjoy life, —the right to be let alone. 
Id. at 193.  The avant garde progress of the late 19th century heightened the need for a right 
to personal privacy and “call[ed] attention to the next step which must be taken for the 
protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the 
right ‘to be let alone.’”  Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 
1888)).  But see United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1114 (3d Cir. 1985) (the privacy 
interest is diminished if the litigant is a public figure generally subject to public scrutiny; 
“the public has a substantial interest in the integrity or lack of integrity of those who serve 
them in public office.”). 
20 Thomas S. Blanton, U.S. Experience with Freedom of Information Law:  Congressional 
Activism, News Media Leadership, & Bureaucratic Politics, COMP. MEDIA L.J. 2 (2003).  In the 
1950’s, the American Society of Newspaper Editors retained Harold Cross to review 
statutes restricting information access.  Id.  His findings “demonstrated that government at 
every level was systematically denying access to information” and questioned the 
distinction between government privacy and individual privacy.  Id.  Cross recognized the 
suppression of information regarding judicial proceedings and noted that: 
Under the impact of expansion of governmental activities, the number 
and kinds of records withheld from public and press inspection have 
enormously increased.  Statutes are high in number and infinite in 
variety; whenever legislators have convinced themselves . . . they have 
passed statutes which run the gamut from that which may perhaps be 
characterized as not ‘‘compatible with the public interest’’ to that 
which appears to have no basis except the belief that it is ‘‘none of the 
public’s business.’’  Some of these statutes impose mandatory secrecy.  
Others provide for such limited inspection that it is highly probable 
that courts would deny public or press inspection. 
CROSS, supra note 18, at 84 (emphasis added).  Cross calls for public recognition of judicial 
secrecy by noting that: 
public business is the public’s business.  The people have a right to 
know. Freedom of information about public records and proceedings is 
their just heritage.  Citizens must have the legal right to investigate 
and examine the conduct of their affairs.  They must have simple, 
speedy means of enforcement. 
Id. at 132 (emphasis added).  Cross provides suggestions for what the press should do to 
address the secrecy that exists in the judicial system: “in light of favorable trends and the 
press record of successes, there seems to be no good reason why a newspaper should not 
put its rights to the test in respect of any record of legitimate interest to the public, unless a 
mandatory statute of clear import bars access.”  Id. at 32-33.  Cross’ position on the press’ 
right to judicial access revolves around the First Amendment, a basis which the Supreme 
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2.  Contemporary Access to Discovery:  A Finite Right 
First taking form in the mid-20th century, modern discovery 
provides litigants access to information held by the other parties, but 
does not compromise or eliminate individuals’ confidentiality interests.21  
Discovery—”an integral part of litigation”—is not limitless, but instead 
has definite boundaries.22  The United States Supreme Court clearly 
renounced the presumption that public access to judicial records is 
absolute in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.23  Six years later, the 
                                                                                                             
Court subsequently invalidates.  See infra notes 24-25, for a discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s decision precluding the First Amendment as a means to circumvent protective 
orders. 
21 James E. Rooks, Jr., Let the Sun Shine In: ‘Sunshine’ Laws Do Not ‘Chill’ Settlements, Say 
Advocates of Open Courts, 39 TRIAL 18 (June 2003).  Professor Edson R. Sunderland is widely 
attributed with developing the then-innovative American discovery principles.  Edson R. 
Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 865 (1933).  
Sunderland’s ideas about discovery highlight the necessity of access to facilitate trial 
preparation: 
Is there any way of bridging this gap between what is set up in the 
pleadings and what will come out in evidence?  It is of course 
important to know in advance the nature and extent of your 
adversary’s claims.  This knowledge is given by the pleadings. But it is 
equally important, in preparing your proof, to know what proof your 
adversary will be able to present in support of his claims and in 
opposition to yours. This knowledge the pleadings does not give. 
Id.  His notions regarding expansive discovery were adopted by the Supreme Court in 
1947: 
No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘‘fishing expedition’’ serve to 
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his 
opponent’s case.  Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered 
by both parties is essential to proper litigation.  To that end, either 
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his 
possession. 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
22 WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 33, 51 (1968).  
In Hickman v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that access to information through 
discovery has definite boundaries.  Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.  In this case, respondents (tug 
boat owners) employed counsel to defend them against potential suits resulting from the 
sinking of a tug in which crew members drowned.  Respondents’ attorney took statements 
from the survivors with an eye toward litigation.  During discovery, the petitioner 
requested copies of written statements taken from the crew members, records, or other 
memoranda made regarding the tug boat incident.  Respondents refused to provide the 
requested materials.  On appeal, the Court found that petitioner’s request, made without 
purported necessity or justification, fell outside of the arena of discovery.  Discovery, “like 
all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.”  Id.  at 507.  Under the 
auspices of Rule 26, “further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches 
upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.”  Id. at 508. 
23 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).  During the criminal trial of 
several of the ex-President’s former advisors on charges in connection with the Watergate 
investigation, portions of tape recordings were played in a public courtroom, and the reels 
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United States Supreme Court rejected the notion of a constitutional right 
to unlimited access to discovery in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart.24  Instead, 
the Supreme Court specifically fettered public access to discovery, 
holding that discovery materials “are not public components of a civil 
trial.”25  Discovery was established to “avoid surprise at trial[,]” not to 
“enlarge the public’s access to information.”26  Protective orders, one 
                                                                                                             
of tapes were admitted into evidence.  Id. at 589.  Respondent reporters petitioned for 
permission to copy, broadcast, and sell portions of the tapes played during the trial.  Id.  
The Court refused to grant access, holding that “the right to inspect and copy judicial 
records is not absolute.  Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, 
and access has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper 
purposes.”  Id. at 598.  It is “well-settled that any policy or presumption favoring openness 
in the judicial system is not absolute and may be limited when, in the discretion of the 
court, it is necessary, to ensure the integrity, efficiency, and fairness of the judicial process.”  
Chollet, supra note 18, at 705.  Similarly, in Mercury News, a newspaper sought to gain 
access to an investigation report commissioned by the City in connection with a sexual 
harassment suit.  San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court- N.D. San Jose, 187 F.3d 
1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).  The court relied on the F.R.C.P. to find that the public had a 
presumptive access to prejudgment civil court records.  Id.  This presumption for openness, 
however, is easily overcome by the presence of “sufficiently important countervailing 
interests” for confidentiality and secrecy.  Id. at 1102. 
24 Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).  In Seattle Times, the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the issue of whether parties in civil litigation have a right to disseminate, prior 
to trial, information gained through pretrial discovery.  The information in question 
concerned the size and nature of a religious foundation’s membership, the names of its 
donors, and the amounts of their donations.  The Court approved the imposition of a 
protective order and declared that a “litigant has no First Amendment right of access to 
information made available only for purposes of trying his suit.”  Id. at 32. 
25 Id. at 33.  The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not preclude court 
control over discovery information, explaining that “pretrial depositions and 
interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. Such proceedings were not open to 
the public at common law. . . and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of 
modern practice.”  Id.  (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court noted that “much of the 
information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially 
related, to the underlying cause of action.  Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but 
not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of 
information.”  Id. at 33.  Additionally, the Court overruled In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979), by concluding that an order prohibiting the dissemination of discovery materials 
before a trial is not the type of classic prior restraint requiring First Amendment scrutiny.  
Id.  Based on Seattle Times, upon a showing of “good cause,” public access to discovery may 
be limited.  Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33. 
26 Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 427, 447 (1991).  The public’s right of access to court proceedings has “never 
been extended beyond the confines of the courtroom and court documents.”  Id. at 429.  See, 
e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 396 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“During 
the last 40 years in which the pretrial processes have been enormously expanded, it has 
never occurred to anyone, so far as I am aware, that a pretrial deposition or pretrial 
interrogatories were other than wholly private to the litigants.”); Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 
34 (declaring that “[l]iberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the 
preparation and trial, or the settlement, of the litigated disputes.”) (emphasis added). 
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method of preserving confidentiality, limit and shield sensitive discovery 
information.27  
B. Protective Orders:  Protecting Privacy in the Pursuit of Justice 
I would rather be exposed to the inconveniences attending too 
much liberty than those attending too small a degree of it.28 
1. Defining Protective Orders 
Protective orders, as defined by F.R.C.P. 26(c), further courts’ control 
over the discovery process and materials.29  There are two different 
                                                 
27 Alan B. Morrison, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants and the Public Interest in 
Disclosure; Where does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 109, 111 (1989).  Protective orders 
prohibit the dissemination of discovery, “except to a few narrow categories of people,” 
which, depending on the particular circumstances, may include “other lawyers in the 
plaintiff’s attorney’s office, the plaintiff herself, expert witnesses, and perhaps a few others 
provided they sign a confidentiality agreement under which they would not divulge any of 
the information without permission from the court or the defendant.”  Id.  But see Gambale 
v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2004) (the “bright light cast upon the 
judicial process by public observation diminishes the possibilities for injustice, 
incompetence, perjury, and fraud. Furthermore, the very openness of the process should 
provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system and a better 
perception of its fairness.”). 
28 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Archibald Stuard, a 
Congressional Representative from Virginia (Dec. 23, 1791), reprinted in THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, vol. 22 at 436 (Julian P. Boyd, et al. eds., 1950). 
29 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outline protective 
orders as follows: 
c) Protective Orders.  Upon motion by a party or by the person from 
whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the 
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other 
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, 
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or 
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including 
one or more of the following: 
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; 
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on 
specified terms and conditions, including a designation of 
the time or place; 
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of 
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking 
discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope 
of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except 
persons designated by the court; 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/9
2007] Rethinking the “Good Cause” Requirement 299 
approaches to protection for discovery materials:  (1) particularized 
protective orders or (2) “umbrella” protective orders.30   
Particularized protective orders protect sensitive discovery materials 
individually, on a document-by-document basis.31  In these instances, the 
burden to prove “good cause” and justify confidentiality falls on the 
party seeking the particularized protective order.32   
On the other hand, umbrella protective orders designate all 
discovery documents as presumptively protected, unless a party 
challenges the confidentiality of a particular document.33  This guarantee 
                                                                                                             
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by 
order of the court; 
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information not be revealed or 
be revealed only in a designated way; and 
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents 
or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as 
directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the 
court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any 
party or other person provide or permit discovery. . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (2007) (emphasis added). 
30 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §11.432 (2004). 
31 Id.  Proponents of narrow, particularized protective orders assert that “[p]rotecting 
only material for which a clear and significant need for confidentiality has been shown will 
reduce the burdensomeness of the order and render it less vulnerable to later challenge.”  
Id.  See generally Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1993). 
32 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986).  Although what 
constitutes proper grounds is not uniform throughout the circuits, one commonality in 
granting particularized protective orders is that the party seeking the protective order 
carries the burden to justify confidentiality and establish the proper grounds to prove 
“good cause.”  Id. 
33 United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Insur. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (1990).  Umbrella 
protective orders are defined as follows: 
private-party agreements for unfettered access to all documents in an 
adversary’s possession.  Most commonly, the agreement conditions the 
unfettered access on the sealing of entire classes of discovery and the 
imposition of a gag order on the parties.  These orders authorize each 
party producing information to designate the information they desire 
to keep confidential. 
Chollet, supra note 18, at 702-03.  The use of umbrella protective orders in discovery is 
widely accepted and is standard practice in complex cases.  United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d 
at 1427.  See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.431 (1985).  In complex 
litigation, where voluminous documents are sought en masse, the discovery process may 
endanger information that a litigant wants to keep confidential.  Id.  But see Proctor & 
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 226-27 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that protective 
orders that automatically authorize sealing records filed in litigation, without individual 
review, are not generally accepted.  Additionally, this case demonstrates that documents 
Kutz: Rethinking the "Good Cause" Requirement: A New Federal Approach t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
300 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
of confidentiality allows each party to make discovery disclosures 
without the delay and expense of adjudicating individual disputes over 
each sensitive document.34  Additionally, umbrella protective orders 
align with the overriding goal of the F.R.C.P., “to secure the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action.”35  Once the court grants 
an umbrella protective order, the burden reverses—all discovery 
                                                                                                             
under an umbrella protective order are subject to challenge to determine whether “good 
cause” exists to include any particular document under the protective order). 
34 Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 
1999).  Determinations of “good cause” do not need to be made on a document-by-
document basis: 
In a case with thousands of documents, such a requirement might 
impose an excessive burden on the district judge or magistrate judge.  
There is no objection to an order that allows the parties to keep their 
trade secrets (or some other properly demarcated category of 
legitimately confidential information) out of the public record. . . 
Id.  See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam) (reasoning that “in complicated cases where document-by-document review of 
discovery materials would be unfeasible,” broad protective orders should be granted “to 
protect documents designated in good faith by the producing party as confidential”); 
Chambers Dev. Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 104 F.R.D. 133, 135 (W.D. Pa. 1985) 
(entering a protective order, providing in part that: “All documents produced in this 
litigation in response to a formal discovery request and all information contained in such 
documents shall be used solely for the prosecution and defense of the instant action and for 
no other purpose or publication, whether directly or indirectly, and shall not be 
disclosed. . .”); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON PROTECTIVE ORDERS, 
CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICES ADDRESSING 
PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 
183 (2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/wg2 
may05draft2 (in cases with large quantities of discovery materials, “a threshold showing of 
‘good cause’ over broad categories of material may be sufficient for the issuance of a 
protective order under F.R.C.P. 26(c).  The purpose of the order would be to facilitate the 
cooperative exchange of voluminous discovery.”). 
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2006).  A number of courts agree that umbrella protective orders that 
allow “each litigant to seal all documents that it produces in pretrial discovery, are 
unproblematic aids to the expeditious processing of complex commercial litigation.”  
Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 178 F.3d at 945.  There is no public right of access to 
discovery before the entry of a judgment.  See generally In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the lower court issued an umbrella 
protective order, based on the fact that “it would be undesirable to have Mobil specify, and 
the court rule on, objections to disclosure of particular documents, since that would slow 
discovery enormously and involve the court excessively in the discovery process.”); United 
States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (in complex 
cases, “[p]articularly those involving large corporate parties, the parties agree to the 
issuance of a broad protective order at the outset for their mutual protection, both from 
their competitors and waiting predatory third parties. . . in those cases it is generally 
conceded that either party could demonstrate the needed ‘good cause’ if put to the test.”).  
Umbrella protective orders are mutually beneficial: defendants are assured confidentiality, 
while plaintiffs get unfettered access.  Chollet, supra note 18, at 702-03. 
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materials are assumed to be protected and the party wishing to access 
the information must prove the burden.36 
Granting protective orders to limit access to discovery is within the 
sound discretion of the court.37  The protections and features of 
protective orders are well-established and standard during the discovery 
phase of litigation; however, the process by which protective orders are 
granted is unstructured and unclear.38  
2. Jumping Through Hoops:  The Steps (or Lack Thereof) To Secure 
Protective Orders 
It is common during litigation for parties to designate documents as 
confidential under the shield of a protective order, subject to court 
approval.39  Protective orders can be granted on a motion from either 
party to the litigation, including both the requesting party and the party 
from whom the information is requested.40  Procedurally, protective 
orders can be granted at any point during the litigation proceedings.41  
                                                 
36 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §11.432 (2004). 
37 Essex Wire Corp. v. E. Electric Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969).  It is 
“beyond question that a court may issue orders prohibiting disclosure of documents or 
information.”  F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1982).  Although the 
F.R.C.P. indicates that “the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action,” the broad scope of discovery is subject to being restricted by 
the issuance of a protective order “for good cause shown.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2006).  
“The granting of such [a protective] order is a matter within the sound discretion of the 
court.”  Essex Wire Corp., 48 F.R.D. at 310.  Protective orders may properly restrain public 
disclosure of pretrial discovery: 
Once the judicial powers of government are engaged, the public has a 
legitimate interest in its appropriate exercise.  When a court adopts a 
protective order, what might otherwise be a private accommodation 
among the parties becomes a public ordering.  The court, through a 
protective order, lends its legitimating force to an agreement between 
the parties with respect to the pretrial disclosure of information.  A 
court order is enforceable by its summary sanctioning powers, 
including the power to impose the sanction of contempt. 
In re Consumer Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 48 (1985).  See also Chem. & Indus. 
Corp. v. Druffel & Commercial Solvents Corp., 301 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1962).  Restrictions on 
public access to discovery, through judicial issuance of a protective order, are appropriate 
upon a showing of “good cause.”  See infra Part II.B.2.a. for a discussion of F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s 
“good cause” requirement. 
38 See infra Part II.B.2. 
39 Chollet, supra note 18, at n.17.  “By far, the protective order is the prevalent method of 
concealing information from public accessibility.”  Id. at 705. 
40 Smith v. The City of Chi., No. 04 C 2710, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26454, 5 (D. Ill. Oct. 31, 
2005).  Additionally, nonparties are permitted to intervene to contest or seek the issuance of 
a protective order.  Courts recognize that “non-parties have valid privacy concerns 
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a.  The “Good Cause” Requirement:  One Requirement, Four Divergent 
Methods 
Once the party seeking a protective order makes a motion in the 
court where the action is pending, F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s “good cause” 
requirement comes into play.42  F.R.C.P. 26(c) stipulates that upon 
“motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought” 
and “for good cause shown,” the court may issue a protective order.43  
Neither F.R.C.P. 26(c) nor the U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a method 
or process by which federal judges are to determine whether or not 
“good cause” is satisfied.44  As a result, determination of “good cause” is 
left to judicial discretion, the rigor of which may vary.45   
                                                                                                             
regarding public disclosure of their personnel information.”  Id.  See also Knoll v. Am. Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 365 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that it “is clear that [the employer] 
defendants had a valid interest in the privacy of nonparty personnel files.”); Gehring v. 
Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (disclosure of a non-party’s personnel files 
“would invade the privacy of the other employees.”).  The correct procedure by which a 
nonparty can challenge a protective order “is through intervention for that purpose.”  
United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at 1427.  See infra Part II.B.2.a. for a discussion on the various 
methods employed by the courts to determine if the F.R.C.P.’s “good cause” requirement is 
satisfied. 
41 NY STATE TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOC., SECRETS KILL: WHY NEW YORK SHOULD ENACT THE 
SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT (May 2004).  In the pretrial phase: 
A judge may be asked to issue a protective order which forbids the 
plaintiff from sharing information disclosed during the case with 
anyone, even government regulators. Corporate defendants sometimes 
require such an order before they will disclose sensitive information 
that could be publicly embarrassing or expose the company to further 
lawsuits. 
Id.  At the conclusion of litigation, “a defendant can request the plaintiff to agree to an 
order to seal all records in a case, including all exhibits and transcripts.  Sealing orders can 
go so far as to remove all trace that the lawsuit even existed.”  Id.  After a trial, defendants 
“can ask for a confidentiality agreement that prohibits” the other party from “revealing 
anything publicly about the case.”  Id. 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (2006). 
43 Id. (emphasis added).  It is firmly established “that a party wishing to obtain an order 
of protection over discovery material must demonstrate that ‘good cause’ exists for the 
order of protection.”  Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994).  See, 
e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d by 821 F.2d 
139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).  “Good cause” is not satisfied and protective 
orders cannot be issued when based merely on complexity or “emotionalism[.]”  Id. at 570.  
The court here held that the class members were entitled to disclosure of materials shielded 
by a protective order in absence of a “good cause” showing.  Id. 
44 See infra Part IV (proposing a new approach and solution, the “Good Cause 
Doctrine”). 
45 See infra Parts II.B.2.a.i-iv (discussing and outlining the various approaches that 
federal judges utilize in order to determine “good cause”). 
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i. Rubber-Stamping Approach 
One breed of judges simply, with no questions asked, rubber-stamps 
protective orders that are mutually-agreed upon and not contested by 
the litigating parties.46  This method of granting protective orders forgoes 
judicial review when a protective order request is unopposed.47  
Opponents criticize rubber-stamping and argue that mere mutual 
agreement of the parties does not satisfy “good cause.”48 
ii. Hostile Approach to Protective Orders:  Resisting Confidentiality 
Litigants, on the other hand, complain that some judges are 
increasingly hostile to confidentiality orders and often resist granting 
protective orders.49  Judges in this arena criticize protective orders on 
                                                 
46 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 785 (observing that “[d]isturbingly, some courts routinely sign orders 
which contain confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of such orders, or 
the countervailing public interests which are sacrificed by the orders[.]”).  See also Bd. of 
Trustees of Cal. State. Univ. v. Sup. Ct., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82, 90 (Ct. App. 2005) (advising 
litigants that in order to obtain confidentiality, “parties could agree on a protective order as 
to such documents at the outset”); Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden From the Public by Order of 
the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 715 (2004) 
(noting that “courts too often rubber-stamp confidentiality orders”). 
47 Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 853 A.2d 880, 882 (N.J. 2004).  At the 
trial court level, the parties agreed to a protective order for all pretrial documents produced 
by Goodyear Tire and, “without making any findings, a trial court signed the Protective 
Order.”  Id. at 882.  “Under the terms of the protective order, Goodyear was permitted to 
earmark as confidential certain information it produced during discovery.”  Id.  On appeal, 
the court refused to enforce the protective order.  Id. at 884.  The court further reprimanded 
the unreviewed manner in which it was issued by stating that trial courts should not 
“rubber-stamp” protective order requests if they “are not accompanied by extrinsic support 
demonstrating good cause for their approval.”  Id. at 883. 
48 Bryan v. Eichenwald, 191 F.R.D. 650, 652 (2000).  Even if the motion for the protective 
order is unopposed, the “determination of good cause cannot be left to mere agreement of 
the parties.”  Id.  Judges are “duty-bound” to “review any request to seal the record (or part 
of it)” and, therefore, “may not rubber stamp a stipulation to seal the record.”  Citizens 
First Nat’l Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (1999).  On the other side of the 
argument, proponents of upholding mutual, uncontested agreements amongst the 
litigating parties to seal documents reason that: 
if the parties are willing, for whatever reasons, to keep most 
information secret, we ought to be willing to allow them to do that.  I 
say that not only because I believe that parties should be able to 
control their own lawsuits, but also because, if we had a rule which 
said that the judge must rule on claims of secrecy on a document-by-
document basis, who would be there to police the judge? 
Morrison, supra note 27, at 121. 
49 Jack E. Pace III, Testing the Security Blanket: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Stipulated 
Blanket Protective Orders, 19 Antitrust ABA 46 (Summer 2005).  Since their inception, 
protective orders have been hailed as “an efficient way to lay down ground rules and 
preemptively resolve discovery disputes.”  Id.  More and more, however, courts refuse to 
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two grounds:  confidentiality unduly limits public access and “good 
cause” is not proven.50  The threshold for “good cause” among this 
group of judges is high and F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s protective order provision is 
essentially disregarded.51 
iii. Detailed Approach:  Requirement of Specificity  
Other judges require a specific showing of “good cause” before 
granting a protective order.52  Judges subscribing to this approach argue 
that it is necessary to “make an independent determination of good 
cause prior to issuing a protective order, even if the parties submit an 
                                                                                                             
grant protective orders: “Even where both parties agree to limitations on the use of their 
opponent’s confidential information—and there is no live dispute before the court 
concerning the use of that information—courts increasingly are rejecting” protective orders 
that the parties stipulate.  Id. 
50 Pace, supra note 49, at 46.  See Polo v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 04-259-DRH 
(S.D. III. June 7, 2004) (order denying a joint motion for a protective order).  Polo involved 
price-fixing claims against seed manufacturers.  The parties proposed the protective order 
out of “concern that sensitive information could be misused” by the other manufacturer “in 
the absence of strict confidentiality protections.”  Pace, supra note 49.  The court, however, 
denied the protective order because of a lack of good cause.  Id.  The court further 
described the parties’ uncontested protective order as a “fudge” and invited the parties to 
submit a “tightly-drawn order which keeps secret only trade secrets or other narrowly 
defined categories of documents.”  Id. 
51 See Beech-Nut Nutrition v. Gerber Prod. Co., No. CIV-S-01-1920 GEB PAN 1, 4 (E.D. 
Cal. Nov. 17, 2003) (order rejecting stipulated protective order).  In this case between 
competitors in the baby food business, the court rejected a protective order that would 
have established “‘two tiers of ‘confidentiality’ and allowed both parties to protect” their 
commercially-sensitive materials “from falling into the hands of their opponent’s 
employees involved in competitive decision making.”  Pace, supra note 49.  While 
acknowledging that the “stipulated order [was] intended to facilitate the discovery 
process,” the court held that the “parties have not shown good cause why such 
information”—which both sides agreed was “highly sensitive”—required protection.  Id. 
52 Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981) (the party seeking the protective 
order must submit “a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from 
stereotyped and conclusory statements”).  Broad allegations, unsubstantiated by specific 
and detailed examples of harm and possible injuries are insufficient and do not 
substantiate a “good cause” showing.  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).  See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 
F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that “broad allegations of harm are not specific to 
establish good cause” for a protective order); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 
1071 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Good cause is established on a showing that disclosure will work a 
clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure,” but the “injury must be 
shown with specificity”); Hobley v. Burge, 225 F.R.D. 221, 224 (2004) (which also utilizes 
the language “clearly defined and serious injury” in describing the method to establish 
whether good cause exists); Bryan v. Eichenwald, 191 F.R.D. 650, 652 (2000) (“In the 
absence of such showing, the court does not find good cause for filing documents under 
seal.”). 
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agreed protective order.”53  Because courts are charged with 
independently concluding whether a particularized showing of fact 
warrants “good cause,” the method and rigor that judges employ 
varies.54   
iv. The Sedona Approach 55 
The 2005 draft Sedona Guidelines developed a readily satisfied 
threshold for obtaining protective orders, but its vague explanation did 
not develop a step-by-step method or provide additional clarity to the 
“good cause” requirement.56  In short, “good cause” is satisfied under 
                                                 
53 Smith v. The City of Chi., No. 04 C 2710, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26454 at 2.  See Citizens 
First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 178 F.3d at 945 (“The judge is the primary representative of the 
public interest in the judicial process” and has an independent duty to “review any request 
to seal the record (or part of it)”).  The district court is best situated to determine relevant 
factors, and it should consider each case individually: 
Discretion should be left with the court to evaluate the competing 
considerations in light of the facts of individual cases.  By focusing on 
the particular circumstances in the cases before them, courts are in the 
best position to prevent both the overtly broad use of [protective] 
orders and the unnecessary denial of confidentiality for information 
that deserves it. . . 
Miller, supra note 26, at 492.  Under this method, modifications of protective orders follow 
the same guidelines.  Id.  As long as a protective order remains in effect, the court that 
entered the order retains the power to modify it.  United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Insur. 
Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (1990).  Modification of a protective order, “like its original entry, is 
left to the discretion of the district court.”  Id.  See  Krause v. Rhodes, 671 F.2d 212, 218 (6th 
Cir. 1982) (holding that the issue of whether a protective order, once issued, should be 
lifted or modified should be “left to the sound discretion of the trial court”). 
54 See Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994); Glenmede 
Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). 
55 The Sedona Conference is a nonprofit law and policy think tank dedicated to the 
advanced study and development of complex civil litigation, as well as antitrust and 
intellectual property law.  The Working Group Series brings together recognized lawyers 
and academics to discuss current issues that are either ripe for solution or in need of a 
“boost” to advance law and policy.  THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON 
PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS, THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST 
PRACTICES ADDRESSING PROTECTIVE ORDERS, CONFIDENTIALITY & PUBLIC ACCESS IN CIVIL 
CASES, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 183 (2005), available at  http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ 
content/miscFiles/wg2may05draft2.  Specifically, this Sedona Conference Working Group 
“was formed out of a desire to help bring some clarity and uniformity to practices 
involving protective orders in civil litigation and determinations affecting public access to 
documents filed or referred to in court.”  Id.  The goal of this Working Group is to provide 
immediate guidance in an effort to reconcile public access and protective orders.  Id. 
56 Id.  In some cases, parties assert “legitimate reasons to limit the dissemination of 
certain information exchanged in the normal course of discovery.”  Id.  Therefore, when 
discovery requires “disclosure of sensitive, confidential information involving matrimonial, 
financial, medical or family matters, or in commercial cases, trade secrets and other 
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the Sedona approach as long as one of the litigating parties is able to 
articulate a legitimate need for confidentiality.57  At most, this 
recommendation emphasizes that F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s “good cause” standard 
does not require a detailed or particularized showing in order to be 
satisfied.58   
In response to the numerous, inconsistent “good cause” tests used by 
the courts and the failure of F.R.C.P. 26(c) to outline judicial criteria by 
which to grant protective orders, the Third Circuit adopted an 
innovative approach to guide judges and provide consistency among the 
circuits.59   
b. The Third Circuit’s Approach to Resolving the “Good Cause” Dilemma  
i.  Pre-Pansy:  Balancing Interests 
Even before the Third Circuit in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg60 
articulated and enumerated specific factors to consider in applying a 
balancing test for granting protective orders, federal circuits around the 
nation applied a similar balancing test, weighing the litigants’ privacy 
interests against the importance of disclosure.61  A decade before the 
                                                                                                             
confidential business information,” protective orders are the way in which judges protect 
the legitimate need for confidentiality.  Id. 
57 Id.  The Working Group articulated that: “the good cause standard generally should 
be considered to be satisfied so long as the parties can articulate a legitimate need for 
privacy or confidentiality, in those instances where the protective order will apply only to 
the disclosure of information exchanged during discovery.”  Id.  The term “legitimate 
need” is not further defined.  Id. 
58 Id.  Further, the Working Group noted that: “Because of the limited scope and 
provisional nature of the protective order, the court need not conduct a detailed 
evidentiary inquiry into the nature of the information at issue, which courts are sometimes 
unwilling or often practically unable to do. . .” Id. 
59 See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the Third Circuit’s “good cause” balancing test). 
60 Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994).  See infra Part II.B.2.b.ii 
(discussing the Pansy test in detail). 
61 See infra notes 61-64 (discussing the inception of the “good cause” balancing test).  But 
see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 911-12 (E.D. Pa. 
1981).  Plaintiffs in an antitrust case moved for vacatur of a pretrial protective order in its 
entirety.  Although the District Court applied a balancing test to validate the protective 
order, it refused to develop a categorical process by which courts should evaluate “good 
cause” and emphasized that individual factors must be considered on a case-by-case basis.  
Id.  This court noted that: 
To apply a balancing test, of course, the particularized interests of the 
litigants for and against disclosure must be weighed. . . The court must 
evaluate the magnitude and imminence of the threatened harm from 
disclosure, including the particularized interests of the litigants against 
disclosure and the general government interests enumerated above, 
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Pansy decision, the Fourth Circuit articulated criteria to balance when 
determining “good cause.”62  The Fourth Circuit’s process balanced the 
reason public access is sought, the importance or necessity of public 
access to the documents, and whether the information furthers improper 
purposes.63  In the same year, the Seventh Circuit, following in the 
footsteps of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, employed a similar balancing 
test, weighing the interests of the party seeking disclosure against the 
importance of the litigants’ privacy.64  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit 
                                                                                                             
the narrowness of the proposed limiting order, and the availability of 
less restrictive alternatives. We cannot, of course, delineate precisely 
the application of the test except on a case-by-case basis. 
Id. at 912.  This balancing test ensures that litigants are guaranteed the necessary materials 
and, at the same time, “protect[s] from unwarranted harm parties whose rights may 
ultimately be vindicated at trial.”  Id. 
62 In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1984).  See infra note 63 (discussing In re 
Knight Pub. Co.). 
63 Id.  In In re Knight Pub. Co., a newspaper reporter, who was denied access to a district 
courtroom, challenged the protective order sealing a state senator’s trial.  The Fourth 
Circuit applied a balancing test to determine if a protective order was appropriate: 
factors to be weighed in the balancing test include whether the records 
are sought for improper purposes, such as promoting public scandals 
or unfairly gaining a business advantage; whether release would 
enhance the public’s understanding of an important historical event; 
and whether the public has already had access to the information 
contained in the records. 
Id. at 235.  Documents may accordingly be sealed “if the public’s right of access is 
outweighed by competing interests.”  Id.  Here, the district court erred in “giving too little 
weight to the presumption favoring access and making its decision to seal the documents 
without benefit of Knight’s arguments for access.”  Id.  The Fourth Circuit based its analysis 
on the criteria previously utilized by the Tenth Circuit, compelling the court to balance the 
aforementioned interests granting a protective order.  In re Coordinated Pretrial 
Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1982).  On 
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the application of the balancing test for granting a 
protective order.  Id.  Specifically, the Tenth Circuit held that: 
The relevance of the requested documents is not an issue in this case.  
Hence, the appropriate balancing test does not concern the relevance 
of the information sought vis-a-vis the burden imposed upon the 
responding party.  Rather, we are concerned with the burden imposed 
upon the responding party if a protective order is not granted as 
compared with the burden imposed upon the requesting party if a 
protective order imposing conditions is granted. 
Id.  Florida argued that the amount of money involved, $8,000, was insubstantial when 
compared to Kerr-McGee’s total assets.  Id.  This argument failed because when balancing 
the interests, the monetary imposition constituted an undue burden and expense within 
F.R.C.P 26(c), and on the other side of the balance, the burden placed on Florida by the 
protective order was not a harsh one.  Id. 
64 Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 1984).  Plaintiffs 
brought pharmaceutical product liability actions against drug companies for injuries 
allegedly caused by exposure to a drug.  Id. at 557.  On appeal, the court held that the 
district court did not adequately weigh the competing hardships to determine the 
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balanced comparable factors in a products liability action when it upheld 
the court’s issuance of a protective order that kept the names of 
participants in a research study confidential.65   
Although the criteria and methods used in each instance varied, the 
circuits began to solidify a balancing test trend to determine “good 
cause.”66  The Third Circuit utilized this groundwork in Pansy to develop 
a list of factors for judges to consider when determining whether 
F.R.C.P.’s “good cause” requirement is satisfied.67 
ii. The Pansy Balancing Test 
Specifically, the Third Circuit operates under the guidelines that a 
protective order cannot be granted unless and until the proponent can 
indicate, with specificity, that disclosure would cause a “clearly defined 
and serious injury.”68  In Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg,69 the court 
                                                                                                             
appropriateness of discovery.  Id.  When protection is sought, the court must “apply a 
balancing test to determine whether the need of the party seeking disclosure outweighs the 
adverse effect such disclosure would have on the policies underlying the [claimed] 
privilege.”  Id. at 559 (internal quotations omitted).  Specifically, “the court must compare 
the hardship to the party [or person] against whom discovery is sought, if discovery is 
allowed, with the hardship to the party seeking discovery, if discovery is denied.”  Id. 
(internal quotations omitted).  Thus, this matter was remanded to review the nature and 
magnitude of the competing hardships.  Id. at 566. 
65 Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir.1985).  In this products 
liability action against a tampon manufacturer seeking recovery for injuries suffered from 
toxic shock syndrome (TSS), the Center for Disease Control (a nonparty) sought a 
protective order to keep the identities of women that participated in the TSS research 
confidential.  The court noted that “federal courts have superimposed a somewhat more 
demanding balancing of interests approach” to granting protective orders under F.R.C.P. 
26(c).  Id. at 1547.  Under this standard, “the district court’s duty was to balance P & G’s 
interest in obtaining the names and addresses of the study participants against the Center’s 
interest in keeping that information confidential.”  Id.  The appellate court validated the 
protective order, holding that the district court “acted within its discretion in holding that 
the Center’s interests in keeping its study participants’ names confidential outweigh the 
discovery interests of P & G.”  Id. 
66 See supra notes 60-64. 
67 See infra Part II.B.2.b.ii (discussing the Pansy balancing test in detail). 
68 Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3rd Cir. 1994).  See also Shingara v. 
Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that Pansy “explained that there is good 
cause when a party shows that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, specific and 
serious injury,” and that “broad allegations of harm are not sufficient to establish good 
cause”).  See infra Part III.A for an in-depth analysis of how subsequent courts have applied 
and modified Pansy. 
69 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 772.  In Pansy, a former police chief filed a civil rights suit.  Id. at 775.  
The parties obtained a protective order, but the press moved for the court to vacate the 
confidentiality agreement.  Id. at 775.  In denying the press’ request, the court held that the 
judiciary possessed an “inherent power to grant orders of confidentiality over materials not 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/9
2007] Rethinking the “Good Cause” Requirement 309 
enunciated balancing test factors for courts to consider when 
determining “good cause.”70  Generally, according to the analysis set 
forth in Pansy, a court should balance the following factors prior to 
issuing a protective order:  
(1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; 
(2) whether the information is being sought for a 
legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose; (3) 
whether disclosure of the information will cause a party 
embarrassment; (4) whether confidentiality is being 
sought over information important to public health and 
safety; (5) whether the sharing of information among 
litigants will promote fairness and efficiency; (6) 
whether a party benefiting from the order of 
confidentiality is a public entity or official; and (7) 
whether the case involves issues important to the 
public.71  
                                                                                                             
in the court file,” most clearly, discovery.  Id. at 785.  The Pansy court laid groundwork and 
articulated criteria for a “good cause” balancing test.  Id. at 786.  A protective order cannot 
be issued without first weighing public and private interests to determine whether “good 
cause” exists: 
All such orders are intended to offer litigants a measure of privacy, 
while balancing against this privacy interest the public’s right to obtain 
information concerning judicial proceedings. . . whether an order of 
confidentiality is granted at the discovery stage or any other stage of 
litigation, including settlement, good cause must be demonstrated to 
justify the order. 
Id.  Especially when the case involves “private litigants, and concerns matters of little 
legitimate public interest,” the court should weigh in favor of granting a protective order to 
preserve confidentiality.  Id. at 788.  See infra Part II.B.2.a for an extended discussion and 
identification of the application of the “good cause” requirement. 
70 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786-87.  Courts should apply this balancing test when considering 
whether to grant a protective order at any stage of litigation.  Id.  But see United States v. 
Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (“It does not appear 
that a mere balancing test would adequately ensure the broad and liberal treatment to be 
accorded the federal discovery rules.”). 
71 Shingara, 420 F.3d at 306 (citing Glenmede Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 483; Pansy, 23 F.3d at 
787-91).  Interestingly, the relevancy of the information is not a consideration in 
determining whether to grant a protective order.  See Smith v. The City of Chi., No. 04 C 
2710, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26454 at 1-10.  Here, the court broadened Pansy by considering 
the relevancy of information when considering a protective order request.  In this case, the 
City sought to protect the confidentiality of the personnel and payroll records of city 
employees produced during discovery.  Id.  The court relied on Seventh Circuit precedent 
that makes it clear that “a trial judge must make an independent determination of good 
cause prior to issuing a protective order, even if the parties submit an agreed protective 
order.”  Id. at 2.  Specifically, the judge has an independent duty to balance the public’s 
interest against the “property and privacy interests of the litigants.”  Id. at 2.  This analysis 
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This balancing test, which specifically addressed the confidentiality of a 
settlement agreement, requires the court to consider the requesting 
party’s need for the information against the possible injury that may 
result from compelled disclosure.72  
When considering the possible harm to the litigants, this balancing 
process compels judges to grant protective orders in instances where 
confidentiality would outweigh the benefit of public access and prevent 
unnecessary injury to the litigating parties.73  If the risk of harm to the 
                                                                                                             
differs from Pansy, however, in that it prioritizes the relevancy of the information to the 
litigation—information important to the litigation is less likely to be subject to 
confidentiality restrictions.  In this matter, “good cause” exists to enter a protective order 
prohibiting public disclosure of social security numbers, salaries, and home addresses of 
city employees, because such information is irrelevant and public disclosure may cause 
unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment and would unfairly invade the privacy of City 
employees.  Id. at 6.  See also Empire of Carolina, Inc. v. Mackle, 108 F.R.D. 323, 327 (S.D. 
Fla. 1985) (the court considered relevancy in denying a motion to compel production 
because the materials sought were “at best of limited relevance” and their disclosure 
presented “the spectre of catastrophic harm.”). 
72 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787.  See Shingara, 420 F.3d at 301.  The district court distinguished 
Shingara from Pansy, as Shingara involved a protective order over discovery materials, 
whereas Pansy addressed confidentiality of a settlement agreement.  Id.  Although the 
district court acknowledged Pansy, by recognizing that it must “balance the privacy 
interests of the parties against the public interest in access to the discovery information,” it 
ultimately rebutted the Pansy criteria and determined that the analysis should not be based 
on the fact that it involved a public official, the Pennsylvania Police, and the fact that it is 
an issue of public concern.  Id. at 306.  The Third Circuit determined that regardless of these 
factual differences, the same balancing process applies.  Id. at 307.  The case was remanded, 
noting that protection is available where “good cause” exists and that “a district court may 
determine that good cause exists only based on reasoning that is true to the direction, 
language and spirit of Pansy.”  Id. at 308. 
73 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787.  “It is appropriate for courts to order confidentiality to prevent 
the infliction of unnecessary or serious pain on parties who the court reasonably finds are 
entitled to such protection.  In this vein, a factor to consider is whether the information is 
being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose.”  Id.  See Glenmede Trust 
Co., 56 F.3d at 476.  When considering a protective order, the Third Circuit applied Pansy 
and lifted a protective order because injury to the private litigants did not exceed the 
public’s interest.  In this case, Glenmede sought a protective order to keep documents 
confidential.  Id. at 481.  The district court denied Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton’s initial 
motion for a protective order, holding that it did not satisfy Pansy’s “good cause” 
requirement.  Id.  On appeal, the court held that “good cause” exists “when it is specifically 
demonstrated that disclosure will cause a clearly defined and serious injury,” based on the 
seven factors that Pansy enumerates.  Id. at 483.  This analysis “should always reflect a 
balancing of private versus public interests,” considering and “focusing on the particular 
circumstances” of each case in order to prevent the “unnecessary denial of confidentiality 
for information that deserves it.”  Id.  Here, Glenmede and Pepper Hamilton asserted that 
general allegations of injury to reputation or embarrassment were not specifically 
articulated, as Pansy requires, and therefore insufficient and preclude protective order 
protection.  Id. at 485.  Because they failed to demonstrate a specific injury from public 
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litigant seeking protection prevails over the public interest, then 
disclosure cannot be compelled.74   
The Pansy balancing factors provide Third Circuit judges with a 
framework for considering the F.R.C.P.’s “good cause” requirement.  
Pansy does not, however, address the issue of trade secrets, an interest 
that various courts, and F.R.C.P. 26(c) itself, recognize as “good cause” 
for confidentiality under protective orders.75 
3. The Trade Secret Dimension:  Trade Secrets as “Good Cause” for 
Confidentiality 
Trade secrets are secret by their very nature.76  When trade secrets 
are involved in the discovery process, a Catch-22 dilemma emerges:  
litigants must disclose the requested trade secrets during the discovery 
process while simultaneously protecting those same trade secrets from 
further unlawful use. 77   
                                                                                                             
access of the privileged documents, a protective order in this matter was not valid under 
the Pansy criteria.  Id. 
74 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786-87.  The public interest component of the balancing test revolves 
around protecting public safety and health, promoting public respect for the judiciary, and 
assuring that judges perform their duties in an informed manner.  The public’s legitimate 
interests in this information must be balanced with the interest of the private litigant who 
seeks to conceal the discovery.  Proponents of public access maintain that “pretrial access to 
information helps the public better understand judicial proceedings and public confidence 
in the judicial system as a whole can be enhanced.”  In Re Consumer Power Co. Sec. Litig., 
109 F.R.D. 45, 54 (1985).  When the newspaper here challenged a protective order entered in 
a securities action, the court upheld the order as appropriate.  When these “functional 
needs of society” are balanced against “the functional needs of the judicial system,” the 
“scope of public access may need to be narrowed and its timing deferred.”  Id. at 54.  But see 
Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993) (the court 
here did not recognize a public right of access to discovery materials). 
75 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets as satisfying “good cause” under F.R.C.P. 
26(c)). 
76 See CNF Packing Co. v. BP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  “Absent any 
protective order, documents produced in litigation may be used for any purpose, including 
direct competition.  Thus, protective orders are essential in trade secret litigation.”  Denise 
H. McClelland & Shannah J. Morris, The ‘Attorneys’ Eyes Only’ Designation and other 
Disclosure Restrictions in Trade Secrets Litigation, 13 Bus. Torts 7 (2006).  See generally In re 
Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d at 356-57. 
77 McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7.  Protection of trade secrets is sufficient “good 
cause” to satisfy the requirement of Rule 26(c) in granting protective orders: 
One means of showing ‘good cause,’ and therefore a frequent subject 
of a Court directed protective order is the so-called trade secret or 
secret process. While Courts have generally allowed this information 
to be discovered, they have limited this right by issuing a protective 
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Although Pansy does not enumerate trade secrets as a factor to 
consider when granting protective orders, courts in every federal circuit 
have held that restricting or denying access to discovery materials may 
be necessary to protect trade secrets.78  When determining whether to 
issue a protective order in trade secret litigation, the stakes are high.79   
                                                                                                             
order which prohibits the disclosure of this information to anyone not 
directly connected with the preparation of the case. 
Essex Wire Corp., 48 F.R.D. at 310.  The logic applied by the court in granting this type of 
protective order is that “if this information were disclosed, the moving party would suffer 
great competitive disadvantage and irreparable harm,” which outweighs the interest in 
public access.  Id.  See Covey Oil Co. v. Cont’l Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir. 1965) 
(holding that discovery was to be made available “only to counsel and independent 
certified public accountants and only for the purposes of the case.  The court forbade the 
use of the material ‘for business or competitive purposes’. . .The right to further protective 
orders upon an appropriate showing was specifically recognized.”); Parsons v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that the party seeking the 
protective order must “demonstrate that the material sought to be protected is confidential 
and that disclosure will create a competitive disadvantage for the party”); United States v. 
Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (the court granted defendant 
corporation discovery of its competitor’s sales data for the limited purpose of preparing a 
defense to the action.  The “data requested in the instant case does not involve secret 
processes or customer lists, categories which have traditionally been considered to be 
entitled to greater protection”).  The “good cause” requirement is satisfied and justified 
when the court issues protective orders to prevent the disclosure of trade secrets.  
Protective orders ensure that “confidential business information is not revealed to the 
public.”  Essex Wire Corp., 48 F.R.D. at 310. 
78 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (“courts have refused to permit their files to serve. . . as 
sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing”).  A 
sample of federal circuit decisions that restrict access to discovery to protect trade secrets is 
as follows: In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (in determining whether 
the district court properly sealed the motions in a state senator’s trial, the Fourth Circuit 
determined that a factor to consider is whether not issuing a protective order will result in 
“unfairly gaining a business advantage”); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d, 141, 147 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (in illustrating the limits to public access, the court noted that the public has in 
the past been excluded from court proceedings to protect trade secrets); Leucadia, Inc. v. 
Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 1993) (in the manufacturer’s action 
against competitor alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, the district court entered a 
protective order for discovery documents containing confidential information.  On appeal, 
the court held that when a district court determines whether sealed documents contained 
bona fide trade secrets, for good cause shown, it may grant a protective order requiring 
that “a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information 
not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.”); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel 
Co. Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 1983) (in considering a protective order, the court noted 
that there are exceptions which limit the public’s right of access to judicial records.   The 
right to inspect judicial records is not absolute and “access has been denied where” they 
include “sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive 
standing.”); Huntsman-Christensen Corp. v. Entrada Indus., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 733, 736 
(C.D. Utah 1986) (plaintiffs initially obtained an order sealing the complaint to facilitate 
settlement negotiations.  The parties, however, failed to resolve their differences. 
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As a result, three levels of restricted disclosure exist to protect 
discovery materials in trade secret litigation.80  The lowest level of 
discovery protection, which simply restricts public access without 
                                                                                                             
Defendants sought an extension of the court’s order sealing the complaint.  In making its 
decision, the court cited Nixon, indicating that “that the factors to be weighed in the 
balancing test include whether the records are sought for improper purposes, such as 
promoting a public scandal or unfairly gaining a business advantage.”); In re Iowa 
Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 1983) (the court here closed the 
hearing to avoid public disclosure of trade secrets and then redacted versions of the 
hearing transcripts, pleadings, and exhibits that were filed on public record.  The court 
provided that if “it determines that secrets are involved, it should then return to the 
courtroom, announce this determination, and state that the remainder of the proceeding 
will be conducted in camera.”); Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 268, 
275 (Cl. Ct. 1998) (a common justification for limiting public access if trade secrets are 
contained therein.  In this proceeding, the danger of publicly disclosing GE’s trade secrets 
justified keeping certain portions of pleadings and hearing transcripts in camera—GE can 
file redacted versions of the transcripts and pleadings). 
79 Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt Health Care Corp. v. Trude, 880 S.W.2d 539 (Ky. 1994).  
If a trade secret is released to the public, “one can never put the genie back in the bottle.”  
Morrison, supra note 27, at 113.  Once trade secret information is released, it cannot be 
recalled: “the injury suffered by petitioners, assuming their adversaries have no right to 
this disclosure under the Civil Rules, will be complete upon compliance with the order and 
such injury could not thereafter be rectified in subsequent proceedings in this case.”  
Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt Health Care Corp., 880 S.W.2d at 541-42.  See also Gen. Elec. Co. 
v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that once 
trade secrets are disclosed, the potential harm cannot be remedied or protected against).  
Trade secrets warrant protection.  Therefore, if the court is uncertain as to whether or not a 
trade secret will be adversely affected, the court should grant the protective order as the 
possibility of inadvertently releasing information through discovery is not to be taken 
lightly: 
Inadvertence, like the thief-in-the-night, is no respecter of its victims. 
Inadvertent or accidental disclosure may or may not be predictable. To 
the extent that it may be predicted, and cannot be adequately 
forestalled in the design of a protective order, it may be a factor in the 
access decision. 
AFP Advanced Food Prod. LLC v. Snyder’s of Hanover Mfg., Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-3006, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 426, 2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 
F.2d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (deciding whether in-house patent attorneys should be 
given access to confidential information through discovery in patent infringement cases)).  
But see Ventrassist Pty. Ltd. v. Heartware, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2005) 
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that any discovery would “damage” the defendant 
because the plaintiff and defendant were competitors in manufacturing medical devices 
and access would give the plaintiff a “competitive advantage.”  The court held that this 
concern was illusory because under the protective order the defendant could restrict 
dissemination of discovery materials under the confidential or attorneys’ eyes only 
designations). 
80 McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7.  Formally, three levels of restricted 
disclosure have emerged to protect discovery materials in trade secret cases: “confidential,” 
“attorneys and client representative(s)” protection, and “attorneys’ eyes only.”  Id.  These 
“levels of protection have been adopted to balance access to discovery” against the “misuse 
of documents and information containing trade secrets produced in discovery.”  Id. 
Kutz: Rethinking the "Good Cause" Requirement: A New Federal Approach t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
314 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
affecting the litigants’ access, is termed “confidential.”81  The 
intermediate level of protection, which restricts the litigating parties’ 
access, is known as “attorneys and client representative(s)” protection.82  
“Attorneys’ eyes only[,]” the most restrictive level of protection, 
provides that such information is only to be shared with the parties’ legal 
counsel and, in certain cases, outside experts.83  Courts have also 
provided that multiple levels of protection may be appropriate for 
different documents in a single case.84   
The approaches to ascertain “good cause” and grant protective 
orders on the federal level vary among and within the circuits.85  A 
uniform federal process to determine what constitutes “good cause” is 
nonexistent.  The Third Circuit’s Pansy balancing test begins to set the 
                                                 
81 Id.  Information designated as “Confidential” is not disseminated to the public, but 
instead can only be used in that particular litigation.  However, these materials may be 
shared and/or reviewed by all of the parties to the suit, witnesses, experts, legal counsel, 
and anyone else directly involved in the litigation.  Id.  See Star Scientific, Inc. v. Carter, 204 
F.R.D. 410, 416 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (although the trade secrets warranted protection, the court 
determined that the lowest level of protection, “confidential,” was sufficient and would 
increase the level of protection afforded to the trade secrets to the “attorneys’ eyes only” 
designation). 
82 McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7.  This intermediate category allows counsel to 
have access “to all the opponent’s trade secret information, but only one or a few client 
representatives, agreed to by the client and the litigation opponent, may receive access to 
such information.”  Id.  See Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., 24 F.R.D. 53, 58 (D. 
Conn. 2004) (the court imposed a less-restrictive middle level of protection—by restricting 
it to counsel, outside experts, and three designated employees of each company—
demonstrating that the client’s needs for certain highly confidential documents outweighed 
the opposing party’s desire to keep them entirely confidential); Zweidinger v. Toyota 
Motor Corp., C.A. No. 94C-06-008, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 327 (Del. 1995) (the court 
granted a protective order but refused to limit it to “attorneys’ eyes only,” and instead 
stipulated that outside counsel, legal staff, one employee of each party, and in-house 
counsel for each party could have access to the discovery). 
83 McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7.  See, e.g., Grayzel v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 162 
Fed. Appx. 954, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (a protective order clearly stipulated who was privy to 
“Confidential” and “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” materials, differentiating the two as different 
levels of protection.  These provisions expressly prohibit persons who come into possession 
of any such information from disclosing it outside of the litigation, regardless of the use). 
84 McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7.  Clients seeking to protect trade secrets may 
use any combination of the three tier designations: confidentiality, attorney plus client 
representative(s), and attorneys’ eyes only.  See Blanchard & Co. v. Barrick Gold Corp., 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5719 (E.D. La. 2004) (the court granted a two-tier protective order, 
including both “confidential” and “attorneys’ eyes only” levels of protection, because of the 
parties’ competitive relationship).  Although each aforementioned level of disclosure 
“impedes the public’s access to court records,” the vulnerability of trade secrets renders 
this restriction within the court’s discretion, as the litigants’ specific interests outweighs the 
presumption of public access.  McClelland & Morris, supra note 76, at 7. 
85 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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proper groundwork, but is inadequate overall because it only provides a 
narrow list of considerations.86  At the state level, legislatures actively 
adopted legislation to govern protective orders, but continue to fall short 
of developing a methodical approach for judges to apply when granting 
protective orders.87  
C. “Sunshine in Litigation” Statutes:  Increasing Access at the Cost of 
Individual Confidentiality 
Sunshine is said to be the best of disinfectants.88 
Although Seattle Times allows limitations on the public’s access to 
discovery materials, the debate regarding the amount of public access to 
all facets of discovery is unresolved.89  Federal and state legislators who 
oppose protective orders attempt to circumvent the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Seattle Times by enacting “sunshine” legislation aimed at 
stifling protective orders and, in effect, maximizing public access to 
discovery.90  
                                                 
86 See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
87 See infra Part II.C (outlining state statutes aimed at restricting confidentiality in 
litigation). 
88 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (1914). 
89 See supra notes 24-25, for a discussion and analysis of Seattle Times.  “At the 
rulemaking level, the Advisory Committee circulated a proposal to amend the protective 
order rule to address some of these concerns in 1993, but the Judicial Conference declined 
to adopt that proposed amendment.  After considering the issue further, the Committee 
decided in March 1998, that it would not propose any further changes to the protective 
order rule and the matter remains in the legislative arena.”  Id.  See also Richard L. Marcus, 
Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 180 (1999). 
90 NY STATE TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOC., SECRETS KILL: WHY NEW YORK SHOULD ENACT THE 
SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT (May 2004).  The term “sunshine” derived from the oft-cited 
statement of Justice Louis D. Brandeis, “[s]unshine is said to be the best of disinfectants.”  
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (1914).  Proponents of these laws believe 
that “[f]ocusing sunlight on public hazards will make it possible to stop them from 
harming others and, with the benefit of public debate, to help lawmakers and government 
officials address any underlying statutory and regulatory deficiencies that allowed the 
hazards to occur in the first place.”  NY STATE TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOC., SECRETS KILL: WHY 
NEW YORK SHOULD ENACT THE SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT (May 2004).  The “sunshine” 
statutes and other limits on confidentiality “reflect the balance that courts and legislatures 
have attempted to strike between the need for confidential settlements” and “competing 
interests,” such as public access.  Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: 
Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 679 (2001). 
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1.  The Proposed Federal “Sunshine in Litigation” Legislation 
At the federal level, there are currently no statutory provisions 
specifically enumerating the criteria for judges to consider when 
granting protective orders.91  Opponents of protective orders have 
introduced bills into Congress with the objective of enacting an official 
presumption of public access to all phases of litigation, including 
discovery, in order to protect public health and safety.92  The underlying 
purpose of the proposed federal legislation, titled the “Sunshine in 
Litigation Act,” is to curb judicial discretion to issue protective orders.93  
If adopted, the sunshine provision would restrict federal judges’ 
                                                 
91 See infra Part II.B.2.b.  Proponents of establishing a federal standard to determine 
“good cause” argue that federal judges have too much discretion, and that too much 
discretion can lead to abuse.  151 CONG. REC. S7831 (June 30, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kohl). 
92 Grimaldi, supra note 18.  Senator Kohl (D-WI) “first introduced the bill in 1990 after a 
Washington Post series uncovered a trend of manufacturers using court-imposed 
confidentiality orders to limit public debate about companies’ products.”  Id.  The Sunshine 
in Litigation Act would have established additional procedural requirements—including 
multiple hearings and specific findings—before a trial judge could close records or 
proceedings.  Chollet, supra note 18, at 734-35.  Additionally, the Act would have 
prohibited the issuance of a protective order anytime public health or safety is at issue.  Id. 
93 149 CONG. REC. S4963-S4964 (April 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kohl).  When Senator 
Kohl reintroduced the Sunshine in Litigation Act in 2003 he emphasized that its purpose 
was to curb a judge’s discretion in granting protective orders: 
Currently, judges have broad discretion in granting protective orders 
when ‘good cause’ is shown.  But these protective orders are being 
misused.  Tobacco companies, automobile manufacturers and 
pharmaceutical companies have settled with victims and used the legal 
system to hide information which, if it became public, could protect 
the American public but endanger their business or reputation.  We 
can all agree that the only appropriate use for such orders is to protect 
trade secrets and other truly confidential company information and 
[this] legislation makes sure it is protected. 
Id. at S4936.  Senator Kohl also outlined his rationale for supporting the Sunshine in 
Litigation Act as being based on a precedent of discretionary judicial granting of protective 
orders: 
The problem is a simple one and has been recurring for decades. An 
individual brings a cause of action against a manufacturer. . . The 
plaintiff, often reticent to continue the litigation process because of 
grief or lack of resources, settles the lawsuit quickly.  In exchange, the 
defendant insists that the plaintiff agree to the inclusion of a 
confidentiality clause.  This mechanism prevents either party from 
disclosing information revealed during the process of litigation.  Both 
of the parties to the lawsuit believe that they have ‘won:’  the plaintiff 
won a satisfactory financial settlement, and the defendant won the 
right to conceal ‘smoking gun’ documents. 
Id.  In short, Kohl believes that “it is time to initiate a federal solution for this problem.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
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discretion by requiring a particularized finding of fact prior to granting a 
protective order.94 
2.  State Approaches to Limit Protective Orders 
On the state level, a handful of states have adopted and enacted 
modified versions of the federally-proposed “Sunshine in Litigation 
Act,” to limit the courts’ power to issue protective orders and allow 
public access to discovery materials.95  Among the jurisdictions that have 
enacted sunshine legislation, the approaches and processes implemented 
vary.96  The majority of state statutes, although different in scope and 
content, focus on compelling the release of information if nondisclosure 
would potentially affect public health or safety.97  The most effective way 
to examine and differentiate these statutes is to categorize states by those 
that include a trade secret exception and those that do not afford 
protection to trade secrets.98  
                                                 
94 Id.  Senator Kohl outlined the process federal courts would follow if his 2005 proposal 
was adopted: 
The Sunshine in Litigation Act is a modest proposal that would require 
Federal judges to perform a simple balancing test to ensure that the 
defendant’s interest in secrecy truly outweighs the public interest in 
information related to public health and safety.  Specifically, prior to 
making any portion of a case confidential or sealed, a judge would 
have to determine by making a particularized finding of fact—that 
doing so would not restrict the disclosure of information relevant to 
public health and safety. 
151 CONG. REC. S7831 (June 30, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kohl).  By requiring this finding of 
fact prior to allowing a protective order, Kohl argues that this “would not restrict the 
disclosure of information relevant to public health and safety.”  149 CONG. REC. S4964 
(April 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kohl). 
95 See infra Parts II.C.2.a-c (outlining the various state approaches). In pushing for federal 
legislation, Senator Kohl noted that “[s]ome states have been proactive” in developing 
sunshine legislation.  149 CONG. REC. S4964 (April 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kohl).  The 
majority of the state-enacted measures stress “the possible utility of information obtained 
through discovery in revealing risks to public health.”  Marcus, supra note 88, at 180. 
96 Rooks, supra note 21, at 18.  “Different jurisdictions have taken varied approaches, 
often depending on the particular secrecy mechanism addressed, but their thrust is usually 
to require greater judicial scrutiny rather than to ban secrecy altogether.”  Id.  Some 
common examples include: declaring a presumption of openness for all court records in the 
jurisdiction; limiting circumstances in which protective orders may be entered; requiring a 
showing of good cause before approving secrecy, with the burden on the secrecy 
proponent; requiring public hearings before orders are granted; allowing intervention by 
interested nonparties; and specifying certain matters that may not be kept secret.  Id. 
97 See infra Parts II.C.2.a-c. 
98 See infra Parts II.C.2.a-c.  The states that afford protection to trade secrets are: Florida, 
Texas, Washington and Louisiana.  Arkansas, on the other hand, does not protect trade 
secrets.  Virginia’s law provides a unique information-sharing framework. 
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a. State Statutes that Require Public Hazard Disclosure, but Provide for a 
Trade Secret Exception:  Florida, Texas, Washington, and Louisiana 
Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation Act laid the groundwork and acted 
as a catalyst for state implementation of legislation inhibiting the judicial 
grant of protective orders.99  Florida is considered to be innovative in 
enacting legislation that prohibits protective orders when doing so 
conceals public hazards.100  Under its anti-secrecy legislation, Florida 
                                                 
99 The Florida “Sunshine in Litigation Act” provides, in part: 
(3)   Except pursuant to this section, no court shall enter an order or 
judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public 
hazard or any information concerning a public hazard, nor shall the 
court enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of 
concealing any information which may be useful to members of the 
public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the 
public hazard. 
(4)   Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or 
effect of concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a 
public hazard, or any information which may be useful to members of 
the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from 
the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be 
enforced. 
(5)   Trade secrets as defined in s. 688.002 which are not pertinent to 
public hazards shall be protected pursuant to chapter 688. . . 
(7)   Upon motion and good cause shown by a party attempting to 
prevent disclosure of information or materials which have not 
previously been disclosed, including but not limited to alleged trade 
secrets, the court shall examine the disputed information or materials 
in camera. If the court finds that the information or materials or 
portions thereof consist of information concerning a public hazard or 
information which may be useful to members of the public in 
protecting themselves from injury which may result from a public 
hazard, the court shall allow disclosure of the information or materials. 
If allowing disclosure, the court shall allow disclosure of only that 
portion of the information or materials necessary or useful to the 
public regarding the public hazard. . . 
FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2005). “Trade secrets” are separately defined as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process that: (a) Derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other 
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and  
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances 
to maintain its secrecy. 
Id. at § 688.002.  In December 2005, the Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the 
constitutionality of the Florida “Sunshine in Litigation” law, holding that it is “rationally 
related to a reasonable government objective.”  Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jones et al., 
929 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (Fla. App. 2005). 
100 NICK SULLIVAN, AUTOMOTIVE LITIG. REPORTER, FLA. APPEALS COURT UPHOLDS 
‘SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION’ LAW (2005), http://news.findlaw.com/andrews/pl/aut/ 
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defines “public hazard” broadly, inhibiting protective orders if the 
litigants’ confidentiality reduces public access to possible hazard 
information.101  If trade secrets are potentially at risk in a public hazard 
matter, the court provides a measure of confidentiality by disclosing 
only the portion relevant to public safety.102  Whereas Florida has 
attempted to protect public interest by prohibiting courts from entering 
protective orders in cases of public importance, Texas attempted to 
restrict confidentiality by establishing a rigorous balancing test.  
In Texas, court records are presumed open and will only be sealed in 
instances where a protective order is the least restrictive means of 
adequately protecting the specific interest asserted.103  The party seeking 
                                                                                                             
20051222/20051222tires.html.  Florida is cited as a model for state implementation of 
legislation that creates obstacles for the judicial issuance protective orders.  Id.  Senator 
Kohl cited the Florida statute during his proposed federal version, indicating that “Florida, 
for example, has in place a Sunshine in Litigation law that severely limits the ability of 
parties to conceal information that effects [sic] public health and safety.”  149 CONG. REC. 
S4964 (April 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kohl). 
101 FLA. STAT. § 69.081(2) (2005).  Under the auspices of the Florida sunshine law, public 
hazards include any “instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, 
person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure, or 
product that has caused or is likely to cause injury.”  Id.  By including such a broad list, the 
statute appears to extend to every possible matter.  However, it is limited in one crucial 
way: in order to be a public hazard, it must have caused injury in the past and be likely to 
do so again.  Id. 
102 Id. at § 69.081(5).  Florida’s only explicit exception—trade secrets “which are not 
pertinent to public hazards”—essentially protects very little in practice, as relation to a 
public hazard is what triggers its application.  Id.  In Florida, in camera hearings balance 
whether the trade secrets are potentially at stake and warrant protection.  Id. at § 69.081.  
Trade secrets include information that “derives independent economic value” from not be 
generally known by the public.  Id. at § 688.002. 
103 Ashley Gauthier, Secret Settlements: Hiding Defects, Hurting the Public,” 24 NEWS MEDIA 
& THE LAW 3 (FALL 2000).  The Texas rule regarding sealing court records is, in part, as 
follows: 
1.  Standard for Sealing Court Records. Court records may not be 
removed from court files except as permitted by statute or rule.  No 
court order or opinion issued in the adjudication of a case may be 
sealed.  Other court records, as defined in this rule, are presumed to be 
open to the general public and may be sealed only upon a showing of 
all of the following: 
(a)  a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs: 
(1)  this presumption of openness; 
(2)  any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general  
public health or safety; 
(b)  no less restrictive means than sealing records will adequately and 
effectively protect the specific interest asserted. 
2.  Court Records.  For purposes of this rule, court record means. . . 
(c)  discovery, not filed of record, concerning matters that have a 
probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety, or the 
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confidentiality through a protective order has the burden of proving that 
a “specific, serious and substantial interest” clearly outweighs (1) the 
presumption of openness afforded by the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 
76a, as well as (2) any probable adverse effect that sealing would have on 
the general public health or safety.104  Texas’s presumption of openness 
allows public access to un-filed settlements and discovery materials if a 
probable adverse effect on public health or safety exists.105  Additionally, 
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a allows third parties, including the 
media, to intervene and challenge sealing orders.106  Texas courts, 
however, have limited public access through the implementation and 
                                                                                                             
administration of public office, or the operation of government, except 
discovery in cases originally initiated to preserve bona fide trade 
secrets or other intangible property rights. 
3.  Notice. Court records may be sealed only upon a party’s written 
motion, which shall be open to public inspection. . . 
4.  Hearing. A hearing, open to the public, on a motion to seal court 
records shall be held in open court as soon as practicable, but not less 
than fourteen days after the motion is filed and notice is posted.  Any 
party may participate in the hearing.  Non-parties may intervene as a 
matter of right for the limited purpose of participating in the 
proceedings. . . The court may inspect records in camera when 
necessary. . . 
6.  Order on Motion to Seal Court Records.  A motion relating to sealing 
or unsealing court records shall be decided by written order, open to 
the public, which shall state: the style and number of the case; the 
specific reasons for finding and concluding whether the showing 
required by paragraph 1 has been made; the specific portions of court 
records which are to be sealed; and the time period for which the 
sealed portions of the court records are to be sealed. . . 
7.  Continuing Jurisdiction. Any person may intervene as a matter of 
right at any time before or after judgment to seal or unseal court 
records. . . However, the burden of making the showing required by 
paragraph 1 shall always be on the party seeking to seal records. . . 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (Vernon 2005). 
104 BP Prods. N. Am., Inc. v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., NO. 01-05-01032-CV, 2006 
Tex. App. LEXIS 4286 (Tex. App. May 18, 2006).  On appeal, BP contended that witness 
statements recounting the victims of an oil facility explosion are not court records and do 
not meet the test set forth in TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a.   Id.  After applying Rule 76a’s two-part test, 
the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the 
corporation’s motion to seal the witness statements.  Id. 
105 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2)(c) (Vernon 2005).  See supra notes 102-03.  “In 1990, the Texas 
Supreme Court promulgated what is perhaps the most far-reaching court-written anti-
secrecy regulation in the nation, Sec. 76a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.  This rule 
creates a ‘presumption of openness’ applying public access to all court records. Court 
records include pretrial discovery documents.”  NY STATE TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOC., SECRETS 
KILL: WHY NEW YORK SHOULD ENACT THE SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT (May 2004). 
106 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (Vernon 2005).  Rule 76a even allows intervention after a final 
judgment, giving the media an opportunity to examine past records if new significance is 
discovered after-the-fact.  Id. 
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application of Rule 76a.107  One exception, trade secret information, is 
afforded confidentiality through protective orders.108  
Washington’s Public Right to Know Bill establishes a strong 
presumption for public access to information in products liability and 
hazardous waste cases.109  The Washington legislature, however, does 
                                                 
107 In re Bain, 144 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. App. 2004).  Texas courts clearly recognize limits to 
public access.  Id.  In a client’s malpractice suit against her lawyer, the judge abused his 
discretion in ordering the disclosure of billing documents.  Id.  These documents were 
subject to a proper confidentiality order under TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a, the client was not 
authorized to receive the documents, and the client did not state how the information 
related to any element of her cause of action.  Id.  Additionally, Texas maintains that 
admissibility is, indeed, a prerequisite for unsealing documents.  Id.  See also Abdelnour v. 
Mid Nat’l Holdings, Inc., 190 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App. 2006).  Documents may be tendered in 
camera for the purpose of obtaining a ruling on the admissibility of such documents.  Id.  
Due to the fact that such documents are not ‘court records,’ the documents do not need to 
be given to the opposing party until the court rules on their admissibility.  Id.  Restraining 
public access, evident in each of these examples, is a byproduct of Texas’ law regarding the 
sealing of court records. 
108 TEX. R. CIV P. 76a(2)(c) (Vernon 2005) (preserving “bona fide trade secrets”). 
109 Washington’s version of the Sunshine in Litigation Act—the Public Right to Know 
Bill—follows, in part: 
(1) (a)  “Product liability/hazardous substance claim” means a 
claim for damages for personal injury, wrongful death, or property 
damage caused by a product or hazardous or toxic substances, that is 
an alleged hazard to the public and that presents an alleged risk of 
similar injury to other members of the public.  (b) “Confidentiality 
provision” means any terms in a court order or a private agreement 
settling, concluding, or terminating a product liability/hazardous 
substance claim, that limit the possession, disclosure, or dissemination 
of information about an alleged hazard to the public, whether those 
terms are integrated in the order or private agreement or written 
separately. . . 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, members 
of the public have a right to information necessary for a lay member of 
the public to understand the nature, source, and extent of the risk from 
alleged hazards to the public. 
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, members 
of the public have a right to the protection of trade secrets as defined in 
RCW 19.108.010, other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information concerning products or business methods. 
(4) (a)  Nothing in this chapter shall limit the issuance of any 
protective or discovery orders during the course of litigation pursuant 
to court rules.  (b) Confidentiality provisions may be entered into or 
ordered or enforced by the court only if the court finds, based on the 
evidence, that the confidentiality provision is in the public interest. In 
determining the public interest, the court shall balance the right of the 
public to information regarding the alleged risk to the public from the 
product or substance as provided in subsection (2) of this section 
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not limit protective orders, but instead only restricts private 
confidentiality agreements.110  Accordingly, before enforcing a 
confidentiality agreement, Washington requires the courts to weigh 
public safety risks against privacy interests.111  Unlike Florida’s 
provision, Washington’s law is not limited to hazards that have actually 
caused injury, but instead applies to confidentiality agreements that limit 
disclosure “about an alleged hazard to the public.”112  As a matter of 
public policy in Washington, trade secrets and commercial information 
are protected and unnecessary disclosure is to be prevented.113 
Like the Washington law, Louisiana’s Sunshine in the Courtroom 
Bill attempts to balance the competing interests of public access and 
                                                                                                             
against the right of the public to protect the confidentiality of 
information as provided in subsection (3) of this section. 
(5) (a)  Any confidentiality provisions that are not adopted 
consistent with the provisions of this section are voidable by the 
court. . . 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611 (West 2005). 
110 Id. at § 4.24.611(4)(a) (“Nothing in this chapter shall limit the issuance of any 
protective or discovery orders during the course of litigation pursuant to court rules.”). 
111 Id. at § 4.24.611(4)(b). 
112 Id. at § 4.24.611(1)(b) (emphasis added).  Confidentiality provisions, as defined by the 
statute, include court orders that “limit the possession, disclosure, or dissemination of 
information about an alleged hazard to the public, whether those terms are integrated in the 
order or private agreement or written separately. . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
113 Id. at § 4.24.601.  Washington’s definition of “trade secrets” referred to in part (3) of 
the aforementioned statute is as follows: 
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: 
(a)  Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use; and 
(b)  Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances 
to maintain its secrecy. 
Id. at § 19.108.010.  Specifically, the Code articulates that: 
The legislature finds that public health and safety is promoted when 
the public has knowledge that enables members of the public to make 
informed choices about risks to their health and safety. Therefore, the 
legislature declares as a matter of public policy that the public has a 
right to information necessary to protect members of the public from 
harm caused by alleged hazards to the public. The legislature also 
recognizes that protection of trade secrets, other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information concerning products or 
business methods promotes business activity and prevents unfair 
competition. Therefore, the legislature declares it a matter of public 
policy that the confidentiality of such information be protected and its 
unnecessary disclosure be prevented. 
Id. at § 4.24.601. 
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litigants’ confidentiality in matters relating to public hazards.114  The 
Louisiana provision does provide exceptions to protect “trade secret” 
and “commercial information,” terms which the statute itself does not 
define.115  As a result, in matters involving public hazards, trade secret 
information remains protected and, therefore, confidential under a 
protective order.116  
                                                 
114 LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426 (2005). In part, Louisiana’s general provisions 
governing discovery indicate that: 
A.  Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is 
sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court 
in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order 
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including 
one or more of the following: 
(1) That the discovery not be had. 
(2) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms. . . 
(3) That the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery. 
(4) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the 
discovery be limited to certain matters. 
(5) That discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court. 
(6) That a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the 
court. 
(7) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated 
way. . . 
B.  If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the 
court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any 
party or person provide or permit discovery. . . 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
115 Id.  The Louisiana provision addresses “commercial information” as follows: 
C.  No provision of this Article authorizes a court to issue a protective 
order preventing or limiting discovery or ordering records sealed if the 
information or material sought to be protected relates to a public 
hazard. . . unless such information or material sought to be protected is a 
trade secret or other 
confidential research, development, or commercial information. 
D.  Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or 
effect of concealing a public hazard, any information relating to a 
public hazard. . . is null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to 
public policy, unless such information is a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
116 Save Our Selves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Com., 430 So. 2d 1114 (La. 
App. 1983).  In a hearing before the Louisiana Environmental Control Commission to 
determine whether permits for hazardous waste disposal and water discharge should be 
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The aforementioned state statutes maximize public access, especially 
in matters involving public safety.  By incorporating exceptions for trade 
secrets and commercially-sensitive information, and thereby preserving 
confidentiality in certain cases, however, they differ from the statute in 
Arkansas.117  
b. State Statute that Requires Public Hazard Disclosure, but Does Not 
Provide for a Trade Secret Exception:  Arkansas 
Unlike the preceding state statutes, the Arkansas statute fails to 
protect trade secrets and reduces private litigants’ right to privacy 
during discovery by prohibiting protective orders in matters regarding 
environmental hazards.118  Under this statute, public access is maximized 
as settlement agreements that conceal potential environmental or public 
health hazards are automatically treated as void by reason of Arkansas’ 
public policy.119  Private contract provisions in Arkansas which restrict 
disclosure of environmental hazards, for trade secret reasons or 
otherwise, are void.   
c.  Information-Sharing With Subsequent Litigants:  Virginia 
Virginia’s statute differs drastically from other states’ sunshine 
legislation because it is based on the principle of information-sharing.120  
                                                                                                             
issued, certain trade secret information—unnecessary to the Commission’s decision—was 
protected by Louisiana’s trade secret exception to public access.  Id. 
117 See infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing Arkansas’ confidentiality statute, which does not 
protect trade secrets). 
118 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (Supp. 2005).  The Arkansas statute titled “Contract 
provisions restricting disclosure of environmental hazards are void,” indicates that: 
(a) Any provision of a contract or agreement entered into to settle a 
lawsuit which purports to restrict any person’s right to disclose the 
existence or harmfulness of an environmental hazard is declared to be 
against the public policy of the State of Arkansas and therefore void. 
(b) For purposes of this section, the term “environmental hazard” 
means a substance or condition that may affect land, air, or water in a 
way that may cause harm to the property or person of someone other 
than the contracting parties to a lawsuit settlement contract. . . 
Id. 
119 Id. at § 16-55-122(a).  See also Chollet, supra note 18, at n.225. 
120 Morrison, supra note 27, at 123.  Virginia prohibits confidential settlements and gag 
rules in wrongful death and personal injury cases, effectively freeing attorneys to discuss 
relevant matters with future litigants.  Id.  Virginia law subscribes to the notion that there 
are no justifications for forbidding one attorney to share documents produced under a 
protective order with another attorney, as long as the second attorney abides by the 
original protective order provisions.  Id.  The Virginia legislature “stepped in and decided 
that certain kinds of disclosures are too important to be left to the lawyers and the 
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Virginia’s protective order provision provides litigants with 
confidentiality by limiting public access, but simultaneously removes 
their ability to control future litigants’ access.121  The Virginia legislature 
does not outline a process by which judges should grant protective 
orders, but instead governs their scope once issued.122   In Virginia, as a 
result of this law, attorneys can share information they receive under a 
protective order with other attorneys involved in similar litigation.123  
State statutory requirements regarding public access to discovery 
materials attempt to govern confidentiality, but fail to sufficiently 
establish a proper and thorough judicial approach to issue protective 
orders.  Additionally, by restricting confidentiality in discovery, the 
sunshine in litigation statutes interfere with attorneys’ fiduciary duty to 
act in their clients’ best interests.124  
                                                                                                             
adversary process” and that “as long as the second lawyer is bound, the defendant gets all 
the protection to which it is entitled.”  Id. 
121 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (2006).  In Virginia, attorneys are not permitted to release 
discovery information under a protective order to the public, but they are allowed to share 
information with subsequent litigants.  The Virginia statute limiting further disclosure of 
discoverable materials is as follows: 
A protective order issued to prevent disclosure of materials or 
information related to a personal injury action or action for wrongful 
death produced in discovery in any cause shall not prohibit an 
attorney from voluntarily sharing such materials or information with 
an attorney involved in a similar or related matter, with the permission 
of the court, after notice and an opportunity to be heard to any party or 
person protected by the protective order, and provided the attorney 
who receives the material or information agrees, in writing, to be 
bound by the terms of the protective order. 
Id. 
122 Id.  Once a protective order is granted, this statute enables the judge to stretch or 
diminish its scope without any restrictions.  Id. 
123 Morrison, supra note 27, at 123.  Weaknesses exist in applying the Virginia 
information-sharing protective order statute.  The Virginia statute does not: 
state whether the other plaintiff’s lawyer must have filed a lawsuit 
already.  It is not clear whether the law applies to other lawyers who 
are either not members of the Virginia Bar or who have cases outside 
of Virginia.  It fails to make clear which court will enforce the 
protective order against the second lawyer—the one issuing the 
protective order, or the one where the second case is pending. 
Id. at 122. 
124 See supra Part II.C.2. 
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3. Interfering with Attorneys’ Fiduciary Duty:  Statutory Requirements 
for Public Access Are Not in Accord with Attorneys’ Fiduciary Duty 
Good counselors lack no clients.125 
Sunshine statutes divide attorneys’ loyalty between their clients and 
the public, which may be inconsistent with the notion of a fiduciary 
duty.  It is well-settled law that, regardless of jurisdiction, attorneys owe 
their clients a fiduciary duty.126  The fiduciary duty binds attorneys to 
represent their clients’ best interests.127  Among the fiduciary duties are 
undivided loyalty, candor, and the ethical obligations of giving clients 
full and meaningful disclosure of conflicts of interest so that the client 
may decide if the representation is in his or her best interest.128  The 
fiduciary duty that an attorney owes clients may not be dispensed with, 
modified, or taken lightly.129  In some instances, protective orders may be 
in accord with clients’ best interests.  As a result, attorneys are bound to 
advocate for maximum confidentiality.130  Statutes regulating 
                                                 
125 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE I, 2 (Signet 2005). 
126 Akron Bar Ass’n v. Williams, 819 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ohio 2004).  See also Huber v. 
Taylor, 469 F.3d 67 (3d Cir. 2006) (comparing various jurisdictions’ approaches—including 
Pennsylvania, Indiana and Texas—to enforcing and regulating breaches of attorneys’ 
fiduciary duty). 
127 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2004).  See Akron Bar Ass’n, 819 N.E.2d at 
680 (“The attorney stands in a fiduciary relationship with the client and should exercise 
professional judgment solely for the benefit of the client and free of compromising 
influences and loyalties”) (internal quotation omitted); In re Tsoutsouris, 748 N.E.2d 856, 
859 (Ind. 2001); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Monsour, 701 A.2d 556, 558 (Pa. 1997) 
(“This public trust that an attorney owes his client is in the nature of a fiduciary 
relationship involving the highest standards of professional conduct.”); Arce v. Burrow, 
958 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1997). 
128 Huber, 469 F.3d at 72.  It is important to note, however, that the purpose of the 
fiduciary duty is two dimensional: it is not just to protect clients, but instead “is also 
designed to regulate the fiduciary and to ensure that the fiduciary performs his [or her] 
duties.”  Id. at 80.  In fulfilling their fiduciary duties, attorneys must avoid conflicts of 
interest, and must also not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”  Milgrub v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 03:05-332, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80, 13 
(D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2007).  See also Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1998). 
129 Huber, 469 F.3d at 72.  See, e.g., Milgrub, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 13 (clearly stating that 
the fiduciary duty that an attorney owes clients is “among the most stringent to be found”); 
Capital Care Corp. v. Hunt, 847 A.2d 75, 84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“It is axiomatic that an 
attorney who undertakes representation of a client owes that client both a duty of 
competent representation and the highest duty of honesty, fidelity, and confidentiality.”).  
As Judge Cardozo observed in In the Matter of Rouss, “[m]embership in the bar is a privilege 
burdened with conditions.”  In the Matter of Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917). 
130 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2004).  See infra Part III.B.2 
(discussing the role of protective orders in discovery).  As an advisor for her clients, a 
lawyer is required to provide advice using her professional judgment, considering not just 
the law, but also “moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the 
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confidentiality diminish attorneys’ ability to fully and effectively 
advocate for their clients.   
State approaches to confidentiality provide a roadmap, but not a 
model, for a system of civil litigation that addresses privacy concerns 
and permits access to the judicial system.  State statutes vary in scope, 
process, and on the issue of whether to protect trade secrets.  Although 
the aforementioned states have enacted provisions guiding state courts’ 
ability to provide confidentiality, the majority of states have not.131  
Outlining the various approaches to which federal judges subscribe, and 
to which states adhere, reveals the fact that a consistent method for 
granting protective orders is non-existent.132  
An established and clear method by which judges on the federal 
level should grant protective orders remains undecided.  Part III 
analyzes the shortcomings of the Third Circuit’s balancing test, promotes 
the notion that a broad array of factors must be considered in effectively 
determining “good cause,” and also highlights the fact that inhibiting 
protective orders circumvents attorneys’ fiduciary duty.  
                                                                                                             
client’s situation.”  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2004).  Considering the 
most economically advantageous method of protecting discovery materials is consistent 
with an attorney’s fiduciary duty.  Id. 
131 Tennessee, for example, refuses to enact legislation to establish standards for sealing 
court records.  See generally Chollet, supra note 18.  The Tennessee Supreme Court flatly 
rejected to Proposed Rule of Civil Procedure 1A which would have adopted procedural 
obstacles and a new standard for sealing court records.  Opponents of the Rule “expressed 
concern over the Proposed Rule’s expansive scope, citing numerous potentially detrimental 
effects of the proposed rule,” including but not limited to “a chilling effect on settlements, 
unnecessary delay of litigation, and potential future disputes due to the vagueness in the 
Proposed Rule as drafted.”  Id. at 741-43.  Due to the lack of “adequate procedural 
safeguards for refining the broad scope of the Proposed Rule” it likely “would have done 
more harm than good.”  Id.  Even proponents of the Proposed Rule, who argue that “public 
notice is a social imperative” acknowledge that this “principle should be tempered to 
provide a reasonable balance of the many competing interests between private litigants and 
the public,” which this restriction on protective orders failed to provide.  Id.  at 745.  
Because of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s attention to the privacy infringements of the 
Proposed Rule, the trial court judge rightly maintains the discretion to issue protective 
orders.  The full text of the proposed Rule can be found at the Tennessee Supreme Court’s 
website: TENN. SUP. CT. (2006), http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/opinions/tsc/rules/proposals/ 
2005/2005amd.pdf. 
132 See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing judges’ approaches to granting protective orders); 
supra Part II.C.2 (discussing state statutes that regulate confidentiality in discovery). 
Kutz: Rethinking the "Good Cause" Requirement: A New Federal Approach t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
328 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
III.  ANALYSIS 
One of the things we cherish most about being Americans is 
our. . . privacy. 
If we lose that. . . we will have lost something irreplaceable.133 
As Part II illustrates, the extent to which F.R.C.P. 26(c) permits 
judges to issue protective orders—and limit public access to discovery 
materials—is unclear.134  While several federal courts and state 
legislatures have attempted to develop tests, no uniform set of rules yet 
exists for judges to consistently consult when determining “good cause” 
under F.R.C.P. 26(c).135  Part III analyzes the tension that arises from 
allowing judicial discretion to govern the issuance of protective orders 
under F.R.C.P. 26(c), critiques the various judicially-created approaches 
to ascertaining “good cause,” and analyzes how protective orders 
comport with attorneys’ fiduciary duties.   
Pansy chartered in new ground when it articulated specific criteria to 
consider when ascertaining whether discovery warrants a protective 
order.136  Nevertheless, Pansy’s “good cause” balancing test is now 
archaic, undeveloped, and fails to account for the wide array of valid 
grounds for protective orders.137  Clearly, Pansy laid important 
groundwork in isolating “good cause” considerations, but it is flawed in 
that it neither develops priorities for judges to consider nor accounts for 
matters in which trade secrets are at risk.138  Additionally, Pansy’s 
unclear approach ushers in public policy shortcomings, such as 
undermining attorneys’ well-established fiduciary duty to serve their 
clients’ best interests.139  Currently, on the federal level, there is not a 
clear, methodical process to ascertain “good cause,” a prerequisite of 
protective orders.140   
                                                 
133 Mark Hansen, No Place to Hide, 83 A.B.A. J. 44, 47 (Aug. 1997). 
134 See supra Part II.B (discussing the various approaches that federal judges currently 
follow to determine “good cause”). 
135 See supra Part II.B (discussing federal circuits’ approaches); supra Part II.C (discussing 
states’ efforts to define instances in which public access is necessary). 
136 See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii (discussing the Pansy test specifically); supra note 71 and 
accompanying text (discussing the seven narrow factors that Pansy outlines for judges to 
consider). 
137 See infra Part III.A. 
138 See infra Part III.B.1. 
139 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the effects of Pansy on attorneys’ fiduciary 
capabilities). 
140 See supra Part II.B.2.a (outlining the various approaches that federal judges currently 
apply when considering whether “good cause” exists). 
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A. The Third Circuit’s “Good Cause” Balancing Test:  Subsequent 
Affirmation & Modification of Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg 
Following Pansy, federal courts began to apply, and in some cases 
modify, its specifically enunciated standards.141  For example, when 
considering the validity of a protective order, the Third Circuit directly 
applied Pansy and lifted a protective order because injury to the private 
litigants did not arise from or exceed the public’s interest in access.142  
Subsequent application of the “good cause” balancing test by the Third 
Circuit not only affirms Pansy’s criteria, but also fundamentally broadens 
its applicability to include discovery materials at-large, not just 
confidential settlement agreements.143  Later modifications of the Pansy 
standard also emphasize and prioritize the relevancy of the information 
in question to determine if “good cause” exists.144 
B. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg:  Laying the Proper (But Not 
Complete) Groundwork for Satisfying the “Good Cause” Requirement 
Pansy enumerated criteria for judges to consider when determining 
“good cause” and, in effect, established the skeleton of a balancing test 
by holding that courts must weigh litigants’ confidentiality interests 
against public access.145  It is necessary to add flesh to the Pansy 
balancing test skeleton, because it lacks important and essential 
considerations, including whether public access to trade secrets provides 
unfair business advantages or disadvantages.146  Moreover, in order to be 
in accord with the F.R.C.P. and attorneys’ fiduciary duty to their clients, 
                                                 
141 See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii (discussing the Pansy balancing test, and noting subsequent 
implementation and modification of it). 
142 See supra note 73 (discussing Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, a case which applies the 
Pansy balancing test and clearly outlines each criteria in its consideration of a protective 
order). 
143 See supra note 72 (discussing Shingara v. Skiles, which clarifies and expands the Pansy 
test to apply to discovery materials, as well as confidential settlements). 
144 See supra note 71 (discussing Smith v. City of Chicago, which expands Pansy’s balancing 
test to include consideration of the relevancy of the information that would be granted 
confidentiality under a protective order). 
145 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s holding and 
reasoning in Pansy); infra Part IV (explaining the proposed “Good Cause Doctrine,” a new 
federal approach which would modify Pansy balancing test and provide flesh to the bones 
of the Third Circuit’s approach); see also Shingara, 420 F.3d at 301 (citing Glenmede Trust Co., 
56 F.3d at 483; Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787-91.). 
146 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets as valid “good cause” under F.R.C.P. 
26(c) and providing a sample of the circuits’ implementation of protective orders in trade 
secret matters). 
Kutz: Rethinking the "Good Cause" Requirement: A New Federal Approach t
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
330 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
additional considerations—particularly trade secrets—should be an 
essential step in establishing whether “good cause” exists.147   
1.  Pansy’s Limited Set of Factors Improperly Fails to Account for Trade 
Secret Considerations When Determining “Good Cause” 
The Pansy analysis is inadequate because it outlines incomplete 
criteria for judges to consider when granting protective orders and does 
not provide a process by which judges should prioritize or balance such 
criteria.148  Trade secrets satisfy “good cause” to grant protective orders, 
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(c), because confidentiality in these instances 
preserves discovery information while shielding litigants from possible 
business injuries or disadvantages.149   
Trade secrets, a source of sufficient “good cause,” are overlooked in 
the Pansy balancing test.150  When considering whether to grant a 
protective order, courts should carefully guard the confidentiality of 
trade secrets because imposing a business disadvantage on litigants as a 
result of forced disclosure of trade secrets is antithetical to the discovery 
process.151  A unique “genie in a bottle” dilemma arises when trade 
                                                 
147 See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of trade secrets on 
attorneys’ fiduciary duty); infra Part IV (proposing the “Good Cause Doctrine,”  an 
approach that would prioritize trade secrets in determining whether discovery information 
warrants confidentiality). 
148 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the Pansy criteria, which are 
listed generally, without an accompanying method or process). 
149 See supra note 77 (discussing Essex Wire Corp., which satisfied “good cause” by 
demonstrating that trade secrets were at risk.  Although generally discoverable, this court 
held that trade secrets warrant protective orders in order to prohibit disclosure of 
confidential information). 
150 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (trade secrets are overtly absent from the 
Pansy “good cause” analysis); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets as “good cause” for 
protective orders, and providing examples of trade secret protection from among the 
Circuits); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 
F.R.D. 34 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (emphasizing that, pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26(c), a court may order 
that trade secrets, confidential research, or other commercial information produced during 
discovery be protected from public disclosure); see also In re Papst Licensing, No. MDL 
1298, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6374, 12 (E.D. La. May 4, 2000) (upholding a protective order 
which required counsel having access to confidential information to refrain from advice in 
patent prosecution for one year as “preparation and prosecution of patent applications . . . 
is an intensely competitive decision making activity”). 
151 See supra Part II.B.3 (noting that the importance of preserving trade secrets’ 
confidentiality is sufficient “good cause” to grant a protective order); supra Part II.A 
(discussing the object and purpose of discovery); see also Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. 
Sundstrand Data Control, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. Del 1988) (“Courts dress technical 
information with a heavy cloak of judicial protection because of the threat of serious 
economic injury to the discloser” of the information). 
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secrets are at issue:  once a judge allows trade secrets to be disclosed to 
the public, the judge cannot restore secrecy and propriety, or put the 
genie back into the bottle.152  If a court is uncertain as to whether or not 
trade secret information will be adversely affected, the court should 
grant a protective order as the possibility of inadvertently releasing 
information through discovery is a serious concern which F.R.C.P. 26(c) 
directly prohibits.153    
By aligning with the stipulations of F.R.C.P. 26(c), the “good cause” 
requirement is satisfied and justified when courts issue protective orders 
to prevent the disclosure of trade secrets.154  A narrow construction of 
“good cause” factors is not in accord with F.R.C.P. 26(c) because it 
circumvents attorneys’ fiduciary duty by restricting the methods by 
which attorneys can effectively advocate for their clients’ best interests.155   
2. Public Policy & the Practical Shortcomings of Pansy:  Considering a 
Narrow Set of Factors when Determining “Good Cause” 
Circumvents Attorneys’ Fiduciary Duties 
In order to comport with attorneys’ fiduciary duties and serve as an 
effective guide for federal judges who are considering protective orders, 
Pansy’s narrow list of factors must be broadened, clarified, and 
prioritized.156  Protective orders that properly account for all “good 
cause” considerations are in accord with attorneys’ fiduciary duties, as 
they enable attorneys to represent their clients’ best interests and avoid 
the lengthy and expensive alternative of designating confidential 
documents throughout the discovery process.157 
                                                 
152 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the unique and important confidentiality quality of 
trade secrets, which F.R.C.P. 26(c) instructs federal judges to protect through protective 
orders). 
153 See AFP Advanced Food Prod. LLC, supra note 79, at 2 (noting that “inadvertent or 
accidental disclosure may or may not be predictable,” but that to the extent that it can be 
predicted, should be prevented through a protective order); see also Commissariat A 
L’Energie Atomique v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 03-484-KAJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12782, 
6-11 (D. Del. May 25, 2004) (emphasizing that when there is an unacceptable risk of 
inadvertent disclosure or misuse of their highly confidential, a protective order should be 
granted). 
154 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the fact that F.R.C.P. 26(c) directly instructs courts to 
protect trade secrets and commercially-sensitive information). 
155 See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing Pansy’s effects on attorneys’ fiduciary duties). 
156 See infra Part III (highlighting the shortcomings and problems with the Third Circuit’s 
Pansy test); supra Part IV (proposing a solution—the “Good Cause Doctrine”—which 
accounts for trade secrets and comports with attorneys’ fiduciary duties). 
157 See infra Part III.B.2 (noting how a narrow construction of “good cause” factors 
circumvents attorneys’ fiduciary duty). 
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It is necessary to establish a clear framework by which judges 
ascertain “good cause” so that attorneys are able to determine from the 
outset if a protective order is the most effective way to represent their 
clients’ best interests.158  For practical reasons, limiting accessibility to 
discovery materials through a protective order may be in the clients’ best 
interests by yielding efficient proceedings, speedier resolutions, and 
often higher-dollar settlements.159 
To require an attorney to consider the interest of the public dilutes 
attorneys’ loyalty to their clients and creates a conflict of interest when 
none need exist.160  Because of the absence of a federal approach to grant 
protective orders, some states undermine the F.R.C.P.’s protection of 
trade secrets by implementing sunshine statutes.161  State sunshine 
statutes diminish attorneys’ ability to act in their clients’ best interest by 
statutorily tying judges’ hands, hindering protective orders, and 
mandating public access without providing a judicial framework for 
confidentiality.162  Imposing a statutory requirement for full public 
access, particularly in complex litigation, would create an unnecessary 
burden on attorneys’ fiduciary duty to serve their clients’ best interests 
by increasing the cost and time frame of litigation.163   
In addition to the logistical benefits of efficiency and speed, the 
confidentiality that protective orders provide may be a necessary device 
for attorneys to preserve clients’ underlying interests.164  For instance, 
one such important underlying interest includes the confidentiality of 
                                                 
158 See supra Part IV (proposing the “Good Cause Doctrine,” a method by which attorneys 
may process their information and, as a result, serve their clients’ best interests by 
anticipating the viability of a protective order). 
159 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the importance of protective orders as a tool for 
attorneys to execute their fiduciary duty).  See also In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 
F.2d at 357 (emphasizing the benefits of protective orders based on the fact that “busy 
courts are simply unable to hold hearings every time someone wants to obtain judicial 
review concerning the nature of a particular document”). 
160 See supra Part II.C.3 (highlighting that attorneys represent their clients, not the public 
at-large, and are bound to serve their clients’ best interests). 
161 See supra Part II.C.2 (identifying and categorizing state statutes that regulate 
confidentiality in discovery). 
162 See supra Part II.C.2 (analyzing the effects of state “sunshine in litigation” statutes). 
163 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing how statutory requirements for public access interfere 
with attorneys’ fiduciary duty); supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the overwhelming benefits of 
protective orders, specifically noting that of efficiency); see also In re Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d at 1326 (holding that protective orders are valid for the sake of 
efficiency, as a document-by-document review “would slow discovery enormously”). 
164 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets, an underlying interest of clients, as valid 
“good cause” for protective orders). 
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trade secret information.165  Failure to account for a broad array of 
important “good cause” considerations skews attorneys’ ability to 
protect their clients’ confidential trade secret information.166  Protective 
orders, and the confidentiality they provide, are key tools that attorneys 
rely on to fulfill their fiduciary duty.167   
Overall, the absence of a methodical process by which federal judges 
ascertain “good cause” inhibits attorneys’ ability to determine the 
optimal course of action for their clients, as it is impossible for attorneys 
to predict whether a particular judge will view the discovery issue as 
constituting “good cause.”168  Protective orders comport with attorneys’ 
fiduciary duty to their clients by enabling attorneys to represent their 
clients’ best interests, increasing the efficiency of the litigation, and 
diminishing the expenses.169  It is necessary, therefore, for federal judges 
to clearly and overtly adopt a methodical process in which to consider 
the broad range of criteria to ascertain “good cause” for granting 
protective orders.170 
IV.  PROPOSING A NEW FEDERAL METHOD TO DETERMINE “GOOD CAUSE” 
Existing rules and principles can give us our present location, 
our bearings, our latitude and longitude.  The inn that shelters 
for the night is not the journey’s end.  The law, like the 
traveler, 
must be ready for the morrow.  It must have a principle of 
growth.171 
Although each federal circuit’s method to grant protective orders 
partially excels, each method fails to offer a clear and workable process 
for federal judges to approach “good cause.”172  Consequently, this Part 
                                                 
165 See supra Part II.B.3 (noting that F.R.C.P. 26(c) specifically protects trade secrets and 
instructs judges to grant protective orders when they are at risk). 
166 See supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting the breadth of attorneys’ fiduciary 
duty). 
167 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing how protective orders maximize efficiency and, often, 
settlement amounts). 
168 See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to the unclear and haphazard variety of federal 
approaches judges currently utilize to determine “good cause”); supra note 71 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Pansy criteria, which are not clear or prioritized). 
169 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing how protective orders comport with attorneys’ 
fiduciary duty). 
170 See infra Part IV (proposing a new approach to resolve Pansy’s shortcomings). 
171 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 19-20 (1924). 
172 See supra Part II.B (discussing the various approaches the Circuits utilize to determine 
“good cause”); supra Part III.A (discussing how subsequent courts have modified and 
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fuses the best aspects of each approach and generates a solution and 
distinct guidelines for federal judges to follow when considering 
whether “good cause” exists to grant a protective order per the 
requirements of F.R.C.P. 26(c).173 
Problems and shortcomings exist with federal judges’ interpretation 
and application of F.R.C.P. 26(c)’s “good cause” requirement.174  The 
absence of a consistent federal standard under which “good cause” is 
determined results in unbridled judicial discretion and inconsistent 
protective orders.175  This Part modifies the Third Circuit’s balancing test 
by proposing significant additions to Pansy’s list of necessary 
considerations and establishes the “Good Cause Doctrine” (“GCD”).176  
The proposed GCD would effectively institute a new, methodical process 
by which federal judges should determine “good cause.”177  
The Pansy balancing test is inadequate.178  Currently, the factors 
considered are too narrow, judicial discretion is unbridled, and the 
granting of protective orders across and within the circuits is 
inconsistent at best.179  Although Pansy articulates seven factors for 
courts to balance when considering whether to grant a protective order, 
the Third Circuit’s approach is too narrow, ineffective, and unclear.180 
A.  A Proper Fusion of the Current Tests:  The Good Cause Doctrine 
The proposed Good Cause Doctrine, which would apply to federal 
courts, widens the factors that federal judges consider when determining 
whether “good cause” is satisfied to warrant a protective order.181  This 
                                                                                                             
expanded the Pansy criteria); supra Part III.B (highlighting Pansy’s failure to account for 
trade secrets as “good cause” and discussing how Pansy’s narrow list of factors 
circumvents attorneys’ fiduciary duty). 
173 See infra Part IV.A (proposing the “Good Cause Doctrine”). 
174 See supra Part III (analyzing the shortcomings with the current approach, or lack 
thereof). 
175 See supra Part II.B.2.a (noting the current variety of judicial approaches to granting 
protective orders). 
176 See infra Part IV.A.  The name “Good Cause Doctrine” (“GCD”) and the factors of this 
test were created solely by the author. 
177 See infra Part IV.A (outlining a new, step-by-step method for judges to apply when 
considering “good cause”). 
178 See supra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the Pansy balancing test, the Third Circuit’s current 
approach to ascertaining “good cause”). 
179 See supra Part II.B (discussing the wide variety of current approaches to “good 
cause”). 
180 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 772.  See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii (outlining the narrow list of Pansy 
balancing test criteria). 
181 See supra Part III.B (analyzing Pansy’s incomplete groundwork). 
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new process, which merges the groundwork laid by Pansy with a 
broader set of factors and a distinct process by which the factors are 
considered, is in line with public policy and the overriding goals of the 
F.R.C.P.182  Unlike the Third Circuit’s unclear balancing test, the 
proposed GCD is a step-by-step process that provides consistent factors 
for federal courts to consider, and instructs judges to methodically 
consider them when ascertaining “good cause.”183   
The proposed GCD would require the party requesting a protective 
order to file a written motion with the adjudicating court.  Additionally, 
a copy of the motion would be simultaneously submitted to a circuit-
wide database that records confidentiality requests.184  The federal judge 
would then consider the protective order motion by applying the 
proposed GCD. 
Under the proposed Good Cause Doctrine, the federal court judge 
would first consider whether the information is being sought for a 
proper or improper purpose.185  Improper purposes would include, but 
not be limited to, inappropriate access to trade secrets, embarrassment of 
the party, and idle gossip.  If the information is sought for an improper 
purpose, then the process is over and the court shall grant a protective 
order.186  
Next, if the information is being sought for a proper purpose—
including evaluating business history and dealings—the federal judge 
                                                 
182 See supra Part II.C.3 (noting how the absence of a consistent and method to determine 
“good cause” interferes with attorneys’ fiduciary duties). 
183 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s approach, the 
Pansy test). 
184 The purpose of the circuit-wide database is to record the frequency of confidentiality 
requests.  Also, it ensures that the public is able to seek out and be aware of possible 
confidentiality.  The discovery materials and information contained therein are not publicly 
released until the judge determines whether a protective order is proper. 
185 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  This portion of the proposed GCD directly 
adopts the second Pansy criteria. 
186 If a protective order is granted under any phase during the GCD analysis, the 
protective order is binding on the parties.  No privilege of information-sharing, as the 
Virginia statute provides, exists under the GCD.  See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the 
Virginia information-sharing statute).  Instead, each subsequent litigant must discover his 
own information and each request must individually undergo the GCD to determine 
whether confidentiality is proper. 
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would then consider whether trade secrets are at risk.187  Under the 
proposed GCD, trade secrets would be defined as follows: 
Commercially-sensitive information, including a formula, 
pattern, practice, design, instrument, compilation of 
information, program, device, method, technique, or 
process that:  
(a)  Derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, 
and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use; 
(b)  Where this benefit must derive specifically 
from not being generally known, not just from 
the value of the information itself; and 
(c)  Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy.188  
If trade secrets are at risk, the federal court shall grant a protective order 
to protect such information.  The scope of protection may vary case-by-
case, but protection of some form is clearly warranted.189 
If trade secrets are not at risk, the federal judge would then ask 
whether the case involves issues important to the public, such as public 
health or safety.190  Under the framework of the proposed GCD, public 
health or safety concerns would include the following:   
Any device, instrument, person, procedure, product, or 
condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure, or 
                                                 
187 See supra note 29 (providing the text of F.R.C.P. 26, which allows for protective orders 
“upon good cause shown”); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing trade secrets as valid grounds for 
“good cause”). 
188 See supra note 99.  The definition of trade secrets is based on the statutory language of 
FLA. STAT. § 688.002 (2005).  The italicized text is the author’s contribution. 
189 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the three levels of trade secret confidentiality). 
190 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Pansy’s factors, which include 
both public health and safety concerns).  This portion of the proposed GCD combines two 
of the Pansy factors into one succinct question. 
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product that has caused and is likely to cause injury to 
the public in the future.191   
If the information is not important to the public, according to the 
aforementioned definition, then “good cause” is satisfied and a 
protective order shall be granted.  
In cases where the information is important to the public, the federal 
court would proceed by asking whether sharing the information with the 
public would promote fairness and efficiency.192  Efficiency is considered 
in terms of both cost and time to the litigants.  If public access would not 
promote fairness and efficiency, then a protective order should be 
granted.  If sharing of information would promote fairness and 
efficiency, then the court should not grant a protective order, and the 
process is complete.  By not requiring a particularized showing of 
“harm” prior to granting or denying a protective order, the proposed 
GCD would eliminate the vague and malleable “harm” component while 
streamlining judicial discretion.  
The protective order hearing would be considered to be severed 
from the underlying case.  It would, therefore, be immediately 
appealable, regardless of the judge’s decision.193  At this phase, any party 
or non-party witness who participated in the preceding hearing would 
be able to appeal.  
B.  Advantages of the Proposed Good Cause Doctrine 
The Good Cause Doctrine provides for consistent and proper 
determination of “good cause” in federal court.  By clarifying and 
                                                 
191 See supra note 101.  The definition of public health or safety concerns is based on the 
statutory language of FLA. STAT. § 69.081(2) (2005).  The italicized text is the author’s 
contribution. 
192 See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii (discussing the Pansy factors). 
193 The interlocutory appeal feature of the proposed GCD is analogous to the recently 
amended F.R.C.P. 23.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (2006) (“A court of appeals may in its 
discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class 
action certification under this rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of 
the order.”).  F.R.C.P. 23 allows appellate review of district court decisions certifying or 
refusing to certify class actions.  Although opponents of appellate review criticize it as 
inefficient, appellate control over district court discretion—in class action certification, as 
well as the issuance of protective orders—performs the important function of reigning in 
district court discretion and regularizing federal circuit decisions.  See, e.g., In re Lorazepam 
& Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 102-06 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Sumitomo Copper Litig. 
v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 138-43 (2d Cir. 2001); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, 
Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293-95 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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prioritizing the Pansy criteria, the proposed GCD delineates the type of 
discovery information that satisfies “good cause.”  Its methodical process 
and principles override undirected judicial discretion, account for a 
variety of “good cause” forms, and also comport with public policy 
interests.  The GCD outlines a clear standard by which protective orders 
may be granted and, as such, allows attorneys to argue proficiently for 
their clients’ interests in litigation where a protective order is at issue.194  
As a result, this clear process eliminates inconsistency in protective order 
issuance and allows attorneys to heighten efficiency and determine from 
the outset if a protective order is the most effective way of representing 
their clients’ best interests. 
There are many problems with the current Pansy balancing test.195  
The proposed GCD model provides a mechanism that efficiently sorts 
out the discovery information that warrants confidentiality from the 
information that implicates public access.  In the spirit of the F.R.C.P.’s 
goals, as well as attorneys’ fiduciary duties, the Good Cause Doctrine 
provides a clear and consistent process by which federal courts should 
determine whether “good cause” exists.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, the absence of a method to determine “good cause” under 
F.R.C.P. 26(c) yields inconsistency and the disparate issuance of 
protective orders among the circuits, while undermining attorneys’ 
fiduciary duties.  Because F.R.C.P. 26(c) does not provide a framework 
for judges to consult when granting protective orders, the approaches 
and standards applied among and within the circuits vary.  The Pansy 
balancing test is undeveloped, fundamentally unstructured, and fails to 
account for a wide array of “good cause” considerations.  The proposed 
Good Cause Doctrine is a new and unique method, which would resolve 
Pansy’s void by developing a thorough, step-by-step approach for judges 
to follow when determining “good cause.” 
This framework is good news for Think Big Technologies from Part 
I, who under the proposed GCD would likely be successful in shielding 
their trade secrets under a protective order.  The first step in securing a 
protective order would be for Think Big Technologies to file a motion for 
a protective order and to simultaneously submit a copy of the motion to 
                                                 
194 The proposed GCD is in sync with attorneys’ fiduciary duty.  It provides attorneys 
with a tangible process to consider and rely on when making decisions about the direction 
of their clients’ litigation. 
195 See supra Part II (analyzing the specific shortcomings of Pansy). 
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the circuit-wide data base.  Assuming this procedural requirement is 
satisfied, the judge will proceed by applying the proposed GCD.   
When applying the proposed GCD, the judge would first consider 
whether the information is being sought for proper or improper 
purposes.  Here, Cokesi is seeking the information for the valid and 
proper purpose of evaluating Think Big’s business history and dealings, 
not the improper purpose of usurping trade secrets or embarrassing the 
other party.  Because the purpose is proper, the federal judge must 
continue by applying step two of the proposed Good Cause Doctrine. 
Next, the judge must consider whether trade secrets or other 
commercially-sensitive information are at issue.  Because Think Big’s 
AMAX camera technology and film techniques are in fact trade secrets, 
the judge will grant a protective order and any discovery materials 
related to this information will remain confidential.196  The proposed 
GCD concludes at this step, and a protective order is accordingly 
granted.   
Protective orders function to limit and shield sensitive discovery 
information, “for good cause shown.”197  Currently, the process by which 
protective orders are granted is unstructured and unclear.  The absence 
of a standard approach, which takes into account the broad range of 
“good cause” varieties, interferes with attorneys’ fiduciary duty to serve 
their clients’ best interests.  Ultimately, the proposed Good Cause 
Doctrine, a new federal approach to granting protective orders under 
F.R.C.P. 26(c), strikes a balanced compromise and protects both 
competing interests:  public access and private litigants’ confidentiality.   
Ashley A. Kutz198 
                                                 
196 At this phase, the judge will also consider the scope of the protective order.  See supra 
Part II.B.3 (discussing the three possible levels of trade secret confidentiality: 
“confidential,” “attorneys and client representative(s)” confidentiality, and “attorneys’ eyes 
only”). 
197 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (2006). 
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